Teaching, Learning & Researching

Spatial Planning



Edited by Roberto Rocco, Gregory Bracken, Caroline Newton & Marcin Dąbrowski

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SPS

Teaching, Learning & Researching
Spatial Planning

TOOLS, CONCEPTS AND IDEAS TAUGHT AT THE SECTION OF SPATIAL PLANNING AND STRATEGY OF THE
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Street scene in Amsterdam. Photo by R. Rocco.

Teaching, Learning & Researching Spatial Planning

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Contents

Spatial Planning & Strategy at TU Delft

REMON ROOIJ, GREGORY BRACKEN, DOMINIC STEAD, ROBERTO ROCCO

The Department of Urbanism of the TU Delft is organised in six sections: Spatial Planning & Strategy (SPS), Urban Design, Environmental Technology & Design, Urban Studies, Landscape Architecture, and Urban Data Science. SPS has three distinct and complementary pillars: (i) Spatial Planning & Strategy, (ii) Regional Design and Planning, and (iii) International Urbanisation & Development Planning. Spatial Planning at TU Delft has an evident, but unique relationship with spatial design, focusing on the development and transformation of spatial form, composition, patterns, structures, and networks.

The sections form the key pillars to Urbanism at Delft University of Technology. They bring together spatial and visual thinking, planning and governance, the urban and non-urban, data and technology, research and design. This integrative approach to urbanism has a long history at TU Delft and makes the University's academic profile in spatial planning highly distinctive and highly ranked.

All over the world, cities and regions are challenged by the risks and opportunities associated with accelerating challenges arising from migration, climate change, the fourth industrial revolution, globalisation, rising inequality, and political instability. They face urgent questions with respect to sustainable growth and transformation that can only be tackled in an interdisciplinary integrative way that promotes social, economic, and environmental sustainability and spatial justice. In other words, they are not only concerned with what to do (i.e. the objectives of spatial planning) but also with how to do it (i.e. processes of democratic citizen engagement and governance).

Over recent decades, spatial planning, policy making, and territorial governance have changed drastically. First, trends of deregulation and decentralisation have had a large impact on traditionally strong spatial planning authorities, such as national governments and national bodies of planning. They have repositioned themselves and gotten new responsibilities, but regional and local planning authorities have had to adapt as well. Additionally, at least in the European Union, private stakeholders and civil society have been given much more room to co-create spatial plans and interventions with those planning authorities. Spatial planning has developed into an inter- and transdisciplinary activity, especially in advanced economies.

Secondly, vision and strategy-making have become mainstream in spatial planning with an increased understanding of the complex, uncertain, networked, and dynamic nature of cities and regions. Planning for resilience and sustainability, for organic growth, for flexibility, and for adaptivity means that planning has become a process of intensive interaction, negotiation, and communication between involved stakeholders, looking for shared visions and strategies to go forward. Such a process is helped by diverse tools and ways of approaching the tasks at hand, with the formulation of alternative spatial scenarios and by vision and strategy-making. These tools contribute to a new planning paradigm that focuses on communication and consensus-seeking in collaborative

decision-making processes. This has increased the need for urbanism-planning professionals who can lead, guide, facilitate, mediate, manage, and steer those processes, across a variety of spatial scales, from neighbourhood to city-region and beyond.

Thirdly, spatial planning has become a more digitised and digitally supported process in many ways. In several places, spatial planning processes are based on E-participation and innovative ways of citizen engagement. Urban (big) data and sophisticated 2D and 3D analysis, visualisation, modelling, and decision-making tools are providing urbanism professionals with more input on the city than ever before, making urban policy-making processes potentially more transparent, explicit, and democratic, and strongly underpinned and supported by actual and dynamic data that allows for evidence-based decision-making.

The changes within the professional field of spatial planning come with many questions that can be researched at the University, focusing on issues of:

- fairness, spatial justice, and democracy building.
- the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in spatial development processes, including the roles and values of planners.
- spatial decision-making processes and how they are informed by socio-spatial data (analysis).

SPS contributes to teaching and research on these questions and contributes to the understanding of theoretical perspectives on the nature, scope, and effects of spatial planning. Our section focuses on (i) international and European territorial governance and policymaking, including their potential for democracy building, (ii) contemporary methods of spatial planning, spatial planning instruments, and spatial planning systems, (iii) territorial evidence and impact assessment. By doing so, the Section contributes to theories of spatial planning and builds on SPS's strong tradition of international comparative studies.

TU Delft is the leading institution in the Netherlands for research and education on Urbanism. It has an established track record of excellence in research, teaching, and learning, confirmed by external assessments.

With this book, we intend to disseminate a specific understanding of what spatial planning entails and how it converses with other disciplines. This understanding is anchored in a Dutch tradition that brings together spatial planning, urban design, environmental technology, urban studies, landscape design, urban data approaches, and more.

Foreword

ROBERTO ROCCO, GREGORY BRACKEN, CAROLINE NEWTON & MARCIN DĄBROWSKI

The complexity and interconnectedness of the urban challenges of today demand integrated and innovative approaches to the planning and design of sustainable, fair, and inclusive cities and regions. This, in turn, requires us to challenge and rethink current planning practice and education. Future generations of planners and designers need knowledge and skills to deal with that complexity by integrating insights from across different disciplines, from urban and regional design, environmental technology, geomatics, and urban studies to history and other branches of the social sciences. Furthermore, they also need to have a strong understanding of the values, ethical challenges, and dilemmas intrinsic to planning practice. These insights, methods, and frameworks provide a foundation for envisioning a future in which justice and sustainability play central roles. Contemporary planners need effective tools for developing shared spatial visions in communicative democratic exercises, to design strategies to achieve those visions, and create action plans for their implementation.

Communication plays a central role in multi-stakeholder environments, especially when power and knowledge are unevenly distributed, as is the case in cities. It is generally understood that the fields of planning and design require a value-oriented stance that seeks to promote pluralism (both epistemological and political) and shape public debate and practice. Planning is seen as a process in which visioning and strategy creation for (and with) diverse stakeholders is carried out. Therefore, blueprint planning is skewed in favour of participatory and deliberative planning.

Conveying ideas and shaping the future are two of the capabilities of planning and design. With the help of design, we can better ground planning in existing spatial conditions and maximise the potentials of a given space. Design adds imagination and creativity to planning practice and opens up opportunities for experimenting with stakeholder participation and (visually) communicating solutions to complex urban challenges.

This book provides an authoritative collection of perspectives on theories, urban challenges, and methods of research and education in planning, from a diversity of perspectives and disciplines. It builds upon the integrative 'Delft approach' to Urbanism, which draws on knowledge and research from design, the social and physical sciences, and engineering. At the Department of Urbanism of TU Delft, students and staff engage in cross-disciplinary and comparative studies to better understand the inherent connections between spatial planning, spatial design, landscape design, environmental technology, urban data science and urban studies.

It is our hope that the various chapters in this book will resonate with the call for a more pluralist and adaptive approach to planning and design, one that is in constant evolution in response to changing needs, circumstances, and perspectives.

Part 1: Concepts and Theories

This book consists of nineteen chapters. For the sake of convenience, we have divided them into three parts, although, as you will see, there is a certain amount of overlap between them. We begin with Part 1, which has seven chapters that discuss concepts and theories. This is followed by five chapters in Part 2 which examine current issues of urban development and planning, while the third and final part, also with seven chapters, looks at

methods and teaching. These contributions represent a snapshot, as it were, of our research and teaching activities at the section of Spatial Planning and Strategy at TU Delft. This book will be updated in years to come as new research avenues open up, and new researchers join our team (and also when this volume's contributors want to share how their own work has developed and expanded in response to evolving societal challenges).

Part 1 begins by presenting crucial concepts and theories in planning and its connected disciplines. The aim is to create a common knowledge base. The first chapter is Roberto Rocco's 'Spatial Justice', which defines this concept and unpacks its implications for spatial planning, and planners' roles. It addresses spatial justice as an important aspect of sustainability and contends that one of the socio-political institutions supporting sustainability is spatial planning. It then examines the role of planning as a tool for public deliberation and identifies participatory planning as a viable tool for achieving spatial justice.

Chapter 2, 'Beyond Territorialism? Why there is no European spatial planning and what to do about it', is by Andreas Faludi and shows how problematic a concept 'territorialism' is, particularly for the European Union, where, he argues, borders are not watertight, therefore states should not plan as if they were.

The next chapter, by Rodrigo Viseu Cardoso, is called 'Theses on Metropolisation: Ten discussion points for research and education'. This defines metropolisation as the transformation of fragmented urbanised areas into coherent and consolidated urban regions. This definition takes into account the effects of long-term and intertwined processes of spatial, functional, institutional, and symbolic integration and the chapter outlines ten open-ended discussion points to inspire debate and further exploration.

Chapter 4, 'Multi-Level and Multi-Actor Governance: Why it matters for spatial planning' by Marcin Dąbrowski, sheds light on the vertical (multi-level) and horizontal (multi-actor) aspects of governance, which he sees as crucial for integrating planning with other policy agendas and for engaging citizens in decision-making processes for the co-creation of planning visions.

Staying with citizen engagement in decision-making processes, Reinout Kleinhans and Enzo Falco's 'Digital Participation in Urban Planning: A promising tool or technocratic obstacle to citizen engagement?' examines digital participatory platforms (DPPs) – a specific type of web-based technology often adopted by governments for citizen engagement in urban planning. Their chapter points out that simply establishing these platforms is not enough, and they highlight five fundamental challenges to their effectiveness, showing that technology is not the main issue, it is the way in which the DPPs are embedded in wider participation approaches that is key to their success.

Eva Purkarthofer's Chapter 6, 'Agency in Planning: (Future) planners as key actors in the strive for sustainable urban development', continues this examination of agency in planning, this time through the lens of sustainable urban development. This 'ubiquitous objective in spatial planning' leads to concrete actions that vary greatly and her chapter examines how agency can contribute to a better understanding of the challenges facing actors in planning today.

The final chapter in Part 1 is by Carola Hein. '(Re)-positioning Spatial Planning History and Historiography' shows how governing bodies have historically used planning tools to advance the interests of select groups, which echoes the concerns of Roberto Rocco's opening chapter on spatial justice. Hein argues that students of spatial planning need to be aware of the background to planning systems, and their global interrelationships, in order to assess the impact these histories have on current and future planning practice.

Part 2: Current Issues

Whereas Part 1 is intended to create a benchmark that will allows readers to dive into current challenges for planning, Part 2 addresses specific current issues, beginning with 'Four Clusters of Thought on Flood Resilience and Climate Adaptation: The state of the art and new directions for spatial planning' by Meng Meng, Marcin Dąbrowski, and Dominic Stead. This shows how planning as an instrumental-technical intervention is mainly used to improve physical environments. However, the implementation of these interventions is often challenging, as can be seen from the authors' review of recent developments in flood resilience and climate adaptation. They identify the four clusters of thought of the title (which are mainly European and American) and call for an enlargement of the scope of planning research to enable us to identify future directions for study.

Chapter 9, by Wilbert den Hoed, is called 'Urban Mobility in Planning: An exclusionary or a uniting force? Conceptualising urban mobility for the planning discipline'. This chapter also highlights the desire to improve the social and environmental qualities of cities, this time through mobility systems. Den Hoed points out that mobility and transport planning have often worked in a disconnected way. His chapter sheds a light on this dichotomy by using new conceptualisations of urban mobility to argue that urban space is better when city planning – rather than transport planning – is at the heart of design.

The next chapter, 'Spatial Planning Policy Tools: A conceptual model', is by Dominic Stead and outlines a conceptual model for the policy tools used in spatial planning. He classifies these using Christopher Hood's NATO model (nodality, authority, treasure, and organisation) and differentiates between substantive and procedural functions. He further distinguishes these from tools used in plan-making (and reviewing), development control, and plan enforcement, since these activities use different tools.

Merten Nefs' chapter, 'Metropolitan Landscape: Definition, mapping, and governance', also examines tools at the planner's disposal. His chapter revisits the definition of metropolitan landscape and discusses one specific tool used to develop it: Community of Practice, reflecting on its qualities and challenges.

The final chapter in Part 2 is Guus van Steenbergen's 'Regional Network Governance in Spatial Planning: Constructing a framework to analyse the influence of regional authorities in metropolitan areas'. This points to an increasing recognition of the importance of the region in spatial planning. He shows how national challenges, like climate adaptation and energy transition, arise from the local level and come together at the regional, yet the region is neither spatially nor administratively bounded. The key focus of his chapter is to examine how regional authorities in the Netherlands influence spatial planning in metropolitan areas. He does this by proposing an analytical framework, and also provides a three-step approach for analysing policy practices at the regional level.

Part 3: Methods and Teaching

Part 3 deals with teaching, particularly the way in which planning can take into account the complexity of the present while simultaneously making it possible to take steps toward desirable and possible futures. It does this by introducing a broad selection of methods, beginning with Gregory Bracken's 'Teaching Theories of Urbanism' which introduces the various theories of urbanism courses taught at the Urbanism Department of the Faculty of Architecture and the Built Environment. He also emphasises the importance of urban theory for an increasingly urbanised twenty-first century.

Chapter 14, by Wil Zonneveld, is called 'Visual Storytelling: Assessing the power of maps in planning'. This chapter discusses the abundant use of visualisation in spatial planning, and, echoing Guus van Steenbergen's chapter at the end of Part 2, is particularly concerned with planning at the region-

al level and beyond, where maps form the dominant mode of visualisation. Zonneveld discusses the techniques map-makers use, and, also in an overlap with Part 2, provides tools for interpreting and assessing them by looking beyond visual style.

Chapter 15 is by Akkelies van Nes. 'Space Syntax in Spatial Planning: A short introduction to its methods, theory development, and application in practice' explains the use of space syntax in spatial planning and gives an overview of the different ways of carrying out spatial analyses in the built environment, underscoring its use in evaluating urban design and planning proposals.

The next chapter, 'Regression Analysis: Quantitative exploration of interactions between the built environment and spatial behaviour' by Arie Romein and Susanne van Rijn, is also quite technical, in that it introduces regression analysis as part of quantitative statistical analysis for empirical research, the outcomes of which can also be extremely useful for urban design and planning.

Chapter 16, 'Planning as Critically Engaged Practice: Consequences for studio education' is by Caroline Newton and emphasises that spatial planning and urban design are not merely technical disciplines but that everyday use of space must be incorporated into any plan or design because of the way they impact people's daily lives. This underscores the importance of seeing planning as an engaged practice, something which is related to Habitat III goals and (more specifically) those of the New Urban Agenda, both of which are committed to enabling sustainable urban development and the creation of integrated and just societies for the future. This chapter also shows the importance of incorporating socio-spatial complexity and the concept of 'the right to the city' into planning education, particularly the design studio, meaning that the focus of the studio will no longer be on what is, but on what is 'yet to be'.

The penultimate chapter in the volume remains with design teaching. Lei Qu's 'Vision and Strategy Making: Teaching spatial planning in design education in a situated learning environment' introduces a pedagogical approach for guiding vision and strategy-making in design studios, showing the use of bridging research, planning, and design by highlighting one particular master's course on design as an example, this shows how its evidence-based/scientific methods can also be explorative, with a search for more plausible and desirable future scenarios, and this is in line with the role of regional design in practice, particularly in the context of collaborative planning.

Finally, we end with Diego Sepúlveda-Carmona's chapter 'Dimensions of Socio-Environmental Approaches as a Platform for Local Development Under Climate Change: Theoretical and practical considerations of transdisciplinarity' which examines the governance of urban processes in the face of variability (for example, climate change). The urgency for responses and actions to extreme weather events transfers additional complexity to less developed societies. This chapter proposes linking climate adaptation processes to the outlining of strategies for local development, and presents a case study to establish a framework for possible interventions for local development strategies.

Concluding note

As you will see, this book is useful for both seasoned professionals and novices wishing to get a head start in learning the fundamentals of planning – this includes teachers and students in the field – but the chapters have all been written with a broader audience in mind as well. Basically, anyone concerned with issues of planning, design, and management of the built environment will find a wealth of ideas and resources for engaging with our most pressing urban and regional challenges.

1 Concepts & Theories



Brainstorming exercise at SCUPAD 2016. Photo by R. Rocco.

Spatial Justice
A crucial dimension of sustainability*

ROBERTO ROCCO

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This chapter seeks to describe the concept of spatial justice and to unpack its implications for spatial planning and the role of planners. It addresses spatial justice as a crucial dimension of sustainability, especially of social sustainability. It argues that justice buttresses public reasoning and public justification and therefore reinforces the social and political structures and institutions that allow for sustainability to exist. It argues that spatial planning is one of those socio-political institutions buttressing sustainability. It argues, furthermore, that Justice is a good "internal and necessary for the successful realisation" of spatial planning, without which it is meaningless. It goes on to examine the role of planning as a public reasoning tool and identifies participatory planning as a viable tool to achieve spatial justice.

SPATIAL JUSTICE, CITIES, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, COMMUNICATIVE TURN, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY

*An earlier version of this text appeared in Rocco, R., Newton, C., D'Alencon, L. M. V., Watt, A. v. d., Babu, G., Tellez, N., . . . Pessoa, I. T. (2021). A Manifesto for the Just City. Delft: TU Delft Open. Excerpts from Patsy Healey's and Doreen Massey's writings have been widely used by me in other texts, websites and communications.

1. Introduction

Social justice is undoubtedly one of the greatest challenges of our times, as rampant inequality erodes the fabric of our societies everywhere, undermining trust in governments and institutions, leading to violence and extremism, and eating at the very core of democracy.

Growing inequality, socio-spatial fragmentation, and lack of access to public goods are threats to the sustainability of our cities, especially when sustainability is understood in its three fundamental dimensions (social, economic, and environmental) (Dillard et al., 2009; Larsen, 2012). Social sustainability can be conceptualised as the social and political structures that hold overall sustainability up. Justice is at the core of social sustainability, as it sustains public justification and the democratic process itself. Social sustainability is underexplored in sustainability studies and the absence of this dimension means there is an enormous gap to be filled in how we understand the role of those social and political structures in planning for the just transition to sustainability.

Moral and political philosopher Alastair McIntyre argues that a practice is defined by the goods internal and necessary for the successful realisation of that practice (McIntyre, 2007). In the case of the planning practice, justice is a definitive 'internal good' that allows planning to achieve its standards of excellence, without which it is meaningless. In other words, I argue that justice is an essential component of planning, without which planning cannot be publicly justified or sustained.

Among other things, this means spatial planning must engage with 'two converging, yet distinct social movements: sustainability and social justice' (Campbell, 2013: 75) to continue to be relevant. The European Union has made big steps in this direction in its European Green Deal (European Commission, 2019) taking up the notion of 'just transition to sustainability' as a core tenet in policymaking.

Justice underscores social sustainability because it helps boost the legitimacy of institutions. In also helps increase support for, compliance with, and suitability of policy. Moral and political thinker John Rawls explains this connection by reminding us that truth concerns validation, while justice determines acceptability: what is acceptable or not acceptable as outcomes of reached agreements (Rawls, 2005).

Justice is in fact inscribed in the very notion of sustainability: 'Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs' (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). The same report advances the idea that 'even a narrow notion of physical sustainability implies a concern between generations, a concern that must be logically extended to equity within each generation' (43). This speaks to the concept of intergenerational justice having a logical extension to the idea of intragenerational justice, that is, justice in this generation, here and now. And, indeed, it seems implausible to imagine a world in which we are worried about the welfare of future generations, while disregarding the needs of the current generation, by which I mean of course a broad concern for the welfare of all human beings, independently of their nationality, gender, race, sexual orientation, or creed.

2. Freedom, justice and sustainability

This concern might, in the view of many, be extended to the well-being of all living beings and of Planet Earth itself, especially when the latter is conceived as a system in which all 'existing biological systems behave as a huge single entity [with] closely controlled self-regulatory negative feedback loops that keep the conditions on the planet within boundaries that are favourable to life' (Boston, 2008: 86). This is known as the Gaia Hypothesis.

For Indian economist and philosopher Amartya Sen (Sen, 2009), there is a special case to be made for the preservation of the environment beyond the satisfaction of our needs and the preservation of our living standards. Sen appeals to the responsibility we have towards other species due to our incommensurable power in relation to the planet and all living beings. This is our 'duty of care' towards the planet, like the duty of care that befalls any adult in relation to a small child. In Sen's example, the adult is so much more powerful and stronger than the small child that a duty of care automatically ensues, as an adult may not allow a child to come to harm through action or inaction, even if they are not biologically related. Likewise, humankind, as a powerful presence on Planet Earth, has a duty of care towards the planet and its natural systems.

This speaks to the case for the 'rights of nature', by which we can also imagine jurisprudence that describes inherent rights of ecosystems and living beings, similar to the concept of fundamental human rights. In this theory, human rights emanate from humanity's own existence, that is, every human being has fundamental rights just because they exist, independently of their country of origin, race, gender, age, and other characteristics. In this perspective, babies do not have fewer human rights than adults just because they cannot communicate with words or write petitions. Babies are born with the full set of human rights by the mere fact that they exist as living sentient beings. In this sense, all living beings should have fundamental rights because they exist, are alive, may experience pain, and are an integral part of the complex systems of life on our planet.

Talking about the 'rights of nature' is difficult because justice is a human invention. Justice allows us to keep interacting with each other, it does not exist in nature. Nonetheless, it is clear that we must extend the notions of rights and justice to the natural world if we wish to keep interacting with it, lest a purely predatory interaction will lead to our mutual destruction. Epstein and Schoukens (2021) recognise a 'jurisprudence trend' towards recognising the rights of nature and argue that 'explicit or not, nature as protected by European Union (EU) law already has certain legal rights in the Hohfeldian sense because other entities have legal obligations towards it' (2021: 205).

For Sen, by extending rights to nature, we are in fact extending our own freedoms, including the freedom to meet our own needs now and in the future. He calls this idea 'sustainable freedom': the preservation and expansion (where possible) of the substantive freedoms and capabilities of people today, without compromising the freedoms and capabilities of people in the future (Sen, 2009: 252-253).

But the emphasis on our own human needs, which is ubiquitous in sustainability science, can also be challenged. For Sen, people have needs, but they also have values, conscience, rationality, freedom, ethics, moral feelings, and codes which determine how soci-

eties are organised. Most importantly, there is power, often expressed in economic or political power, which makes our relationships with each other and with nature unbalanced.

3. Cities: The spaces of shared life

Cities are a spatial expression of this organisation. Cities are the predominant mode of human inhabitation in the twenty-first century (Gross, 2016), and they seem to exert an enormous pull towards those seeking for a better life, as testified by the dramatic urbanisation of the world after World War II. According to the World Economic Forum, the world's urban population has risen almost six-fold between 1950 and 2018, from 751 million to 4.2 billion people (Ghosh, 2019), or more than 52% of the world's total population. Such a dramatic urbanisation process was triggered by two intertwined reasons: overall population increase and upwards trends in people migrating to cities from rural areas (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2018). However, cities do not offer the same opportunities to all who come seeking for opportunities to improve their lives. There is an (urban) geography of the distribution of the burdens and benefits of human activity, where those burdens and benefits (in the form of services, public goods, and environmental quality) are unevenly distributed. In short, where an individual or household lives in the city will have a determining impact on their access to opportunities, services and (public) goods (Marcuse, 1997; Van Kempen, 1994).

This distribution follows diverse patterns and path dependencies, according to each place's history, geography, economic and social development, presence and quality of democratic institutions, and a myriad of other factors that influence the distribution of those burdens and benefits in space and among different social groups.

Somewhat counter intuitively, cities have enormous advantages over rural areas: density is maybe their most significant feature (Glaeser, 2000). Spatial density means density of interactions and opportunities as well, and density is also the breeding ground of innovation and exchange (Jacobs, 1969). Cities are spaces where we simultaneously cooperate and compete for resources, and where we must decide together how these resources are distributed and shared.

British social scientist and geographer Doreen Massey claimed urban space as the dimension of multiplicity: 'If time is the dimension of sequence, then [urban] space is the dimension of contemporaneous existence. In that sense, it is the dimension of the social and therefore it is the dimension that poses the political question of how we are going to live together' (Massey, 2011). Massey calls this idea 'radical simultaneity', in which stories, ongoing trajectories, and multiple voices happen simultaneously, but not symmetrically. Space is permeated by asymmetrical power relationships, practices, and interactions. In a world of growing inequality, scarce resources, and climate emergency, this conception feeds increasing uncertainty about how the burdens and benefits of our coexistence can be fairly distributed among us and whether there is a spatial dimension to social justice. Simultaneously, this triggers a deeper reflection on how to foster spaces of true democracy and participation in deciding how those burdens and benefits are distributed.

Therefore, Spatial Justice seems to be especially

relevant today, as it allows us to focus on the spatial dimension of the distribution of the burdens and benefits of our association in cities and on the manner this distribution is governed.

Spatial justice focuses on two dimensions of justice: distributive and procedural. On one hand, distributive justice seeks the creation, fair allocation of, and access to public goods, resources, and services throughout the city. This is connected to the geography of distribution we mentioned earlier. On the other hand, justice or injustice can also be found in how resources and public goods are negotiated, planned, designed, and managed. Justice or injustice can be found in the procedures of negotiation, planning, and decision-making. For example, planning processes that are transparent and allow some form of citizen participation are bound to be more just than those that do not. This is because the incorporation of multiple voices in decision-making processes increases the chances that the wishes, needs, and desires of those voices are integrated in decision-making.

But as Massey's conceptualisation reminds us, the city is also the space of power differences, friction, and disagreement, where vulnerable groups are generally silenced or unable to have their needs, interests, and aspirations considered. Despite its obvious advantages, citizen participation and engagement are by no means a panacea to solve this impasse.

4. Citizen participation and spatial justice

Citizen participation as an activity supporting procedural justice in planning encompasses a large variety of engagement and participation methods, in practice mostly related to the lower steps of Sherry Arnstein's famous 'ladder of participation' (Arnstein, 1969).

The vast majority of democratic theory, and deliberative democratic theory in particular, either implicitly or explicitly assumes the need for widespread citizen participation. It requires that all citizens possess the opportunity to participate and also that they take up this opportunity. But empirical evidence gathered over the past half-century strongly suggests that many citizens do not have a meaningful opportunity to participate in the ways that many democratic theorists require, and do not participate in anything like the numbers that advocates of participation theorists believe is necessary (Parvin, 2018: 31).

Reasons for low levels of citizen engagement in policymaking abound (Parvin, 2018) and are as much related to governance styles and other political, cultural, and economic factors as they are to public officials' unwillingness or lack of capacity to engage citizens.

Following Sen (2009), in order to advance the idea that communicative rationality and public reasoning can deliver urban policy that is both 1) better informed about the pleas, needs, and wishes of citizens and 2) more just, because it includes the voices of the vulnerable and silent, we must find innovative ways to encourage citizens to participate and enable policymakers to guide more meaningful

and fruitful forms of engagement.

Despite the serious critiques to participatory processes put forward, it is difficult to imagine the Just City without some form of participation and co-creation. These can be found in the ideas of French Marxist philosopher and sociologist Henri Lefebvre in his concept the Right to the City (1968), which we will discuss in a moment.

One of the first proponents of the idea of Spatial Justice was American political geographer Edward Soja. For Soja

> Thinking about space has changed significantly in recent years, from emphasizing flat cartographic notions of space as container or stage of human activity or merely the physical dimensions of fixed form, to an active force shaping human life. A new emphasis on specifically urban spatial causality has emerged to explore the generative effects of urban agglomerations not just on everyday behaviour but on such processes as technological innovation, artistic creativity, economic development, social change as well as environmental degradation, social polarization, widening income gaps, international politics, and, more specifically, the production of justice and injustice (Soja, 2009, n.p.).

Soja states that spatial justice 'seeks to promote more progressive and participatory forms of democratic politics and social activism, and to provide new ideas about how to mobilise and maintain cohesive collations and regional confederations of grassroots social activists [...] Spatial justice as such is not a substitute or alternative to social, economic, or other forms of justice but rather a way of looking at justice from a critical spatial perspective' (Soja, 2010: 60). In this perspective, 'the spatiality of (in) justice [...] affects society and social life just as much as social processes shape the spatiality or specific geography of (in)justice' (Soja, 2010: 5).

For Soja, Spatial Justice is not only about distribution and procedures, but has a potential for insurgent action that disrupts and reimagines the *status quo*. And indeed, our time is a time of successive crises: climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, indecent inequality, and cynical populist leaders that caters to the interests of economic elites by subverting the public realm and eroding democratic norms. These crises seem to have a common root in our economic system: capitalism in its current predatory form is not socially, economically, or environmentally sustainable. But we have naturalised capitalism, as if it were an ineluctable 'natural system' appropriate to human nature. This conception completely disregards other forms of economic organisation that have existed before capitalism and continue to exist in traditional societies and at the fringes and interstices of modern ones.

I wish to argue that ours is a crisis of imagination: we cannot imagine a future that is not market-based. Most importantly, many among our fellow citizens and politicians have naturalised the idea of rational choice that underscores the idea of an invisible hand of the market to the point where we cannot imagine a world that is not organised by this 'market'. It is easier to imagine a planet ravaged by climate change than to imagine a different economic and social form of organisation that is fairer, more humane, and respectful of the rights of people and nature.

Following the ideas of Professor Faranak Miraftab of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, our minds are colonised by ideas of individual free-

dom and entrepreneurship that are meaningless if we cannot agree on how we will live together in our cities and in a planet whose resources are finite. There is no freedom possible outside of a society in which we all collaborate with each other, so we can all be free. And sustainability is meaningless if we do not have sustainable freedom, following Sen's conceptualisation.

4. The Right to the City

The concept of the Right to the City was formulated by Henri Lefebvre (Lefebvre, 1968) and is firmly grounded on ideas about active citizenship: the right to take part in the affairs of the city, to make decisions about one's own living environment, and therefore realise one's full potential as a political being, realising one's "sustainable freedom". More recently, British Marxist economic geographer David Harvey, and others, have written extensively about the right to the city. According to Harvey (2003), the Right to the City is the right to actively shape the city to one's needs and desires, thus exercising one's full citizenship. In liberal democratic societies, public involvement in the affairs of the city is institutionalised and democracy is representative through elected officials or through other indirect forms of participation. The ability of common citizens to directly interfere in the affairs of the city is limited by a number of obstacles: lack of time, socio-economic and cultural exclusion, lack of access to relevant knowledge, poverty, and many other issues. These are sometimes insurmountable hurdles to full active citizenship in some societies.

Planning and designing the city must cope with constant change and with the need to 'redistribute' power among stakeholders, leading to the fair redistribution of resources, services, and opportunities. This fair redistribution of power among stakeholders in the conduction of the affairs of the city is one of the fundamental aspects of Spatial Justice.

And indeed, in a world struggling through a climate emergency, where resources are dangerously depleted and social and economic instability are rampant, reaching consensus and acting collectively to avoid or mitigate the worse effects of the crisis seems to be the most rationally self-interested thing to do. In this sense, justice concerns a wide range of subjects that concern us collectively, as humanity, in relation to ourselves, to the planet and to other species. Spatial justice remains crucial to how we address these problems in connection to how we conceive and manage our living spaces.

But there are very special circumstances in which compromises can be reached and just outcomes achieved. Those circumstances are often not present in how our cities are planned, designed, and managed, but it is our task as planners, designers, and managers of the built environment to create those circumstances and to improve the fair distribution of burdens and benefits of urbanisation.

5. Communicative rationality and planning: potential for fair and inclusive policymaking

In the 1990s, a new 'style' of planning started to emerge, championed by authors like Edith Innes, Patsy Healey, and John Forester, heavily influenced by German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas' communicative rationality theory. This is concerned with clarifying the norms and procedures by which agreements can be reached and

is therefore a view of reason as a form of public justification (Bohman & Rehg, 2007). This 'public justification' is irrevocably intertwined with notions of democracy, diversity, and justice. Public justification is also a form of shared truth-forming. As we saw with Rawls (2005), truth concerns validation, whereas justice determines acceptability: what is acceptable or not acceptable as outcomes of people's and institutions' actions and agreements. Both contribute to the formation of a democratic public sphere.

This 'communicative turn' (Healey, 1996) is important for planners, designers, and managers of the built environment, because it has far-reaching consequences for how they act and interact with others influencing the allocation of resources in the city (distributive Spatial Justice) as political agents. In this perspective, planners, designers, and managers of the built environment must make efforts to include the voices of a variety of stakeholders to discuss any given issue arising from the distribution of resources in the city (procedural Spatial Justice).

It also implies that citizens have a duty to participate in civic debate (Rawls' 'duty of civility') and, as pointed out by Brandon Morgan-Olsen, they also have a duty to listen to each other and to the arguments emanating from a variety of sources (Morgan-Olsen, 2013). As we have seen, these issues and more make public participation problematic, if highly desirable.

British planner Patsy Healey offers a step forward to incorporating these ideas into planning theory and practice, and explains the possibilities of a 'communicative turn' in planning from the recognition that we are diverse people living in complex webs of economic and social relations, within which we develop potentially very varied ways of seeing the world, of identifying our interests and values, of reasoning about them, and of thinking about our relations with others. The potential for overt conflict between us is therefore substantial, as is the chance that unwittingly we may trample on each other's concerns. Faced with such diversity and difference, how then can we come to any agreement over what collectively experienced problems we have and what to do about them? How can we get to share in a process of working out how to coexist in shared spaces? The new wave of ideas focuses on how we get to discuss issues in the public realm (Healey, 1996: 219).

Healey correctly identifies this 'new wave of planning' (albeit not so new by now) as having the potential to reconstruct the public realm and publicness. Healey recognises the influence of Habermas in this enterprise by positing that

> He [Habermas] shows us that we are not autonomous subjects competitively pursuing our individual preferences, but that our sense of ourselves and of our interests is constituted through our relations with others, through communicative practices. Our ideas about ourselves, our interests, and our values are socially constructed through our communication with others and the collaborative work this involves. If our consciousness is dialogically constructed, surely, we are deeply skilled in communicative practices for listening, learning, and understanding each other. Could we not harness these capacities explicitly to the task of discussion in the public realm about issues which collectively concern us? (Healey, 1996: 219)

Healey asserts that ideas of communicative rationality focus on ways of 'reconstructing the meaning of a democratic practice', based on more inclusive practices of 'inclusionary argumentation'.

For Healey, this is equivalent to a form of public reasoning which accepts the contributions of all members of a political community and recognises the range of ways they have of know, valuing, and giving meaning. Inclusionary argumentation as a practice thus underpins conceptions of what is being called participatory democracy (Fischer, 1990; Held, 1987).

> (...). Through such argumentation, a public realm is generated through which diverse issues and diverse ways of raising issues can be given attention. In such situations, as Habermas argues, the power of the 'better argument' confronts and transforms the power of the state and capital (Healey, 1996: 3).

There are close connections between Rawls' theory of justice and Habermas' communicative rationality. For Healey,

> Habermas' ideas have the potential to reconstruct democratic practice towards more inclusive participatory forms of democracy based on inclusionary argumentation. Inclusionary argumentation implies public reason that 'accepts the contributions of all members of a political community and recognizes the range of ways they have of knowing, valuing, and giving meaning' (Healey, 1996: 219).

As a practice, Healey argues, it has the potential to regenerate the public realm in which diverse issues and diverse ways of raising issues can be given attention. In such situations, Healey argues, 'the power of the "better argument" confronts and transforms the power of the state and capital' (Healey, 1996). We posit that communicative rationality has the power to make sense of, and distribute justice.

In this sense, the communicative turn in planning recognises that communication plays a central role in achieving agreements about how spatial burdens and benefits should be distributed. It goes further to posit the inclusion of 'alternative rationalities', that is, the need to include silent or oppressed groups in the dialogue and communication so as to maximise the chances of just agreements being reached, as the exclusion of certain groups from communication and decision-making leads to unfair/unjust outcomes for those groups. This idea is at the core of procedural spatial justice and includes issues of democracy, participation, accountability, transparency, and more. This is also very close to contemporary thinkers' ideas on the distribution of power by the recognition of alternative rationalities, such as Foucault's Power/Knowledge theory (Foucault, 1975; 1990; Foucault & Gordon, 1980) and Paulo Freire's 'pedagogy of the oppressed' (Freire, 2018 [1968]).

It is perhaps naïve to expect that 'just procedures' will produce 'just outcomes', or that the 'power of the good argument' will subvert power, especially in contested urban environments where economic forces override the possibility of fair public debate, but democracy still is our best chance to deliver social justice, and most specially, the Right to the City for everyone.

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Mind map on Spatial Justice made by students of the Departme



nt of Urbanism at TU Delft. Photo by R. Rocco. Printed with permission.

Beyond Territorialism?

Why there is no European spatial planning and what to do about it?

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This paper is about my path from studying Dutch to European planning. Looking at the latter made me identify a 'territorialism' that subdivides land into supposedly self-contained units as a basic organising principle. Where the EU is concerned, territorialism is problematic: relations, spatial or otherwise, between EU members states take the back stage. A strong, maybe even a federal EU might help but is not on the cards. So, European planning cannot take a leaf out of the book of Dutch planners. At least as far as the twentieth century has been concerned, the latter have pointed the way to a well-ordered Netherlands. But in the EU, member state should not plan as if each were a law unto itself. They should accept that, like in the Middle Ages, borders are not watertight but that there are criss-crossing governance arrangements, functional or otherwise. Nor could European spatial planning, if it existed, be about making one overall scheme, like the one Dutch planners once did for their own country. Instead, we see multiple, overlapping schemes hanging like a cloud over the land. Which only goes to show that not everything can be contained within the territories of each EU member state. The paper ends a consideration of how to create awareness of this, and how to critique territorialism in teaching.

DUTCH TWENTIETH-CENTURY PLANNING, EUROPEAN SPATIAL PLANNING, THE EU CONSTRUCT, TERRITORIALISM, PLANNING PEDAGOGY

1. Introduction

In Faludi and van der Valk (1994), we unravelled to our own satisfaction the secret of Dutch twentieth-century planning: its having a 'planning doctrine' for how to keep the country in shape. More about this below, but what needs saying here is that Dutch conditions at the time were of course different from those prevailing in the European Union (EU) the planning of which was the object of my next research. It has led me from being a, perhaps naïve enthusiast of the EU to being – no, not a Eurosceptic – but circumspect about the meaning of European integration: if it is not about creating a federal, let alone a superstate, maybe it is something novel. And, if so, then we might also need novel forms of planning. Consider, for instance, the notion of 'ever closer union'. Wrongly understood to mean the formation of a federal, some would say a super-state, this is now anathema. So would, if one were to be proposed, an EU spatial plan. In matters of spatial planning, member states are sovereign: answerable to nobody but their voters. Which rests on the further assumption of the land surface of the globe being divided into territories, each the responsibility of a state. What is meant by the term territorialism in the title of this chapter is precisely this: the world being divided into clearly marked and distinct territories, with pride of place going to the territories of sovereign states. The term itself comes form Jan Adriaan Scholte. Accordingly, territorialism means 'that macro social space is wholly organized in terms of units such as districts, towns, provinces, countries and regions. In times of statist territorialism more particularly, countries have held pride of place above the other kinds of territorial realms' (Scholte, 2000: 47).

It is also relevant to look at Jan Zielonka, my source of inspiration in coming to terms in Faludi (2020 [2018]) with European integration and planning. He has invoked Max Weber in saying that in states, functional and geographic borders coincide (Zielonka 2001: 508). This suggests states are like containers. So, leaks in their walls need to be plugged. In terms of Sack (1986: 19) they cast doubt on the ability of states to control people, phenomena, and relationships by asserting control over a geographic area: what he calls their territoriality.

To give an example that is topical: fearing being dammed if not seen to be doing something about COVID-19, states invoked their territoriality by excluding potential carriers of the virus. It is the same when, nurturing life-saving equipment and vaccines, they prevent these from being taken outside their borders. In other words (even if more symbolic than effective as a measure) the border must be closed, asserting the state's territoriality.

Spatial planning, too, involves drawing borders. Could a putative European planning do the same? Where would it draw its powers from? The question is pertinent, since a permissive consensus has made room for scepticism about European integration. That there is a way out is anything but certain. This has become central to my thinking and research. I discuss European planning below, but not before relating the contrasting case of twentieth-century Dutch planning.

2. Dutch planning, the sources of inspiration

Coming to this country, with its reputation for orderliness and planning, I started comparing Dutch practice with that of England and Wales, with two university towns, Leiden and Oxford, the cases I selected. While not the topic here, the finding that Dutch local planning was unable to give firm guidance to urban development was a surprise. In Flexibility and Commitment in Planning: A comparative study of local planning and development in the Netherlands and England (Thomas et al., 1983) we interpreted the issue in terms of the dialectics between flexibility and commitment.

I followed this up by exploring an, at the time, unique Dutch practice: national planning. The main issue was the imbalance between the dynamic Western Netherlands and the periphery. Deflecting pressure away from the former to the benefit of the latter seemed the solution. But there was also a concern to preserve the pattern of development in the Western Netherlands with its characteristic ring of cities and towns arrayed around a relatively open space. This pattern has acquired international fame as the 'Randstad', with its 'Green Heart' (Dieleman & Musterd, 1992). To manage urban growth in ways leaving this pattern more or less intact, development needed to be channelled away from the Green Heart and towards new growth centres designated for the purpose. The practice of guiding investment to designated areas called growth centres at the time continues to the present day when – see below – Dutch doctrine has more or less been abandoned.

There was remarkable consensus about the policy as described, and the pragmatism in managing it, throughout the latter parts of the twentieth century (Faludi & van der Valk, 1994). In an effort to understand how, we drew on discussions about the development of science, in particular on Thomas Kuhn (1970). Kuhn had pointed to the existence of scientific paradigms guiding research, often to the exclusion of other schools of thought. We posited that planning needing something similar. We called this a doctrine. The Dutch doctrine we saw in particular as being based on an image of the shape of the country, together with ideas on how to preserve and enhance it in the future. Development that would impair this shape, like building massively in the Green Heart, was unthinkable, the forbidden, the eternal sin. Just like anomalies could lead to the downfall of a paradigm in what Kuhn called a scientific revolution, so too with Dutch doctrine: massive development in the Green Heart could signal a doctrinal revolution.

The danger could be reduced by maintaining the pattern which the doctrine prescribed. Which required locating the growth centres mentioned above where they enhanced the development of the Randstad. Syphoning off pressure, this made it possible to restrict development in the Green Heart.

We were not the only ones to draw inspiration from the development of science. In a parallel effort, Wil Zonneveld (1991) invoked, not Kuhn but rather his critic, Imre Lakatos (1970), in identifying patterns in the conceptual development of Dutch strategic planning.

Importantly, adherence to the doctrine was achieved, not through dictates but through building consensus in the relevant policy community. In this respect, what helped was the evocative term 'Green Heart' for the open space, much appreciated as it was, in the core of the Randstad. Policies

advocated by mavericks to develop the area were out of bounds. As with paradigms which, in order to change, required a 'scientific revolution', changing doctrine, too, would require a doctrinal revolution, we reckoned. And, as revolutions go, this one, too, would result in the removal of the planning elite behind the doctrine.

Dutch doctrine has since lost its edge, but Green Heart and the Randstad are still household terms. What has happened to this doctrine has not been the object of my further research. I turned my gaze towards European spatial planning, which will be discussed in a moment. Suffice to say, rather than a veritable revolution, the twenty-first century saw the doctrine petering out and national planning suffering from benign neglect until it has, to all intents and purposes, disappeared. The national government abandoning all ambition to guide spatial development is perhaps the ultimate demise of the doctrine.

3. Territorialism, its origins, and dangers

I started researching European planning in the same way as I had done before with Dutch planning: by looking at its practice. The occasion for doing so has been planners from the Dutch national planning agency themselves taking an interest in the matter. To articulate issues in European planning in terms of a territorialism that conceives of the land surface of the globe – see above - as neatly divided into the territories of sovereign states took time.

But I soon figured that to expect a European doctrine on the Dutch model was 'a bridge too far' (Faludi, 1996). After all, conditions during post-war reconstruction in the Netherlands had been uniquely favourable. And, of course, the EU was not a state and not remotely as cohesive as the Netherlands. Only later did it become clear to me that it was not even a state in *statum nascendi*, but rather an enigma.

Reminded of when I came to Dutch planning as an outsider, I set out to look at the humdrum practice of what went on under European planning. So, once I had found out about a 'European Spatial Development Perspective' (ESDP) in the making, Bas Waterhout and I engaged in an in-depth study of its making (Faludi & Waterhout, 2002).

There have been occasions, most recently in Faludi (2020; 2021), for revisiting this process. Importantly, giving up control over their territories was anathema to EU member states. But the planners involved learned to cooperate. The problem was the national administrations. They either ignored the planners or, where their work seemed to concern matters of national interest – in the Dutch case, for instance, the position of the Port of Rotterdam – they told them to take such issues off the agenda. The opposite – planners being instructed to ensure that matters of little overall relevance be included – was also the case: when Greece and Turkey were at loggerheads over an outcrop off the port of Bodrum on the Turkish mainland, Imea (Kardak in Turkish; see Mann, 2001: 34) the Greek member of the team was ordered to insist that this speck of land to be shown on all maps.

Clearly, I needed a better understanding of the EU based as it is on intergovernmental treaties. Those treaties are so comprehensive that the EU seems like a federation, but its members have more say than would be the case in a true federation. Relations are also evolving, giving rise to misun-

derstandings and outright conflict. Jacques Delors, Commission President from 1985-1995, once described the EU as an 'unknown political object'. Another way of putting it is saying that it is *sui generis*: one of a kind. Whatever, the uncertainty over what it was made people ask where integration was heading and what it meant for the more familiar figure of the democratic sovereign state.

Working on the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) with planners from the member states, an activist European Commission considered the EU territory as a whole, but the planners from the member states – see above - were beholden to look at what it meant for their own countries. And these had the upper hand. Spatial planning was not, after all, what is called an EU competence. It could be argued that one such was implied, for instance in the so-called Structural Funds, the vehicles for pursuing social and economic cohesion. But, whilst welcoming essential Commission support for its logistic preparation, led by the Germans, the representatives of the member states considered the ESDP a matter for so-called intergovernmental cooperation. With each member state having what amounted to veto power, this led to lowest- common-denominator decisions. So, in the end, the Commission lost patience. Looking forward to being given a competence at the next occasion: a pending review of the EU treaty, the Commission ended its logistic support for the ESDP in 1999.

The discussion about changing the treaty was not in terms of spatial planning but of territorial cohesion. This seemed a logical add-on to the existing EU competence for economic and social cohesion. Under it, the EU operated the European Regional Development Fund giving assistance, mainly to less favoured regions. In anticipation of territorial cohesion appearing on the books, more or less the same planners, from more or less the same countries that had taken a lead before, prepared the 'Territorial Agenda' as a kind of follow-up to the ESDP. Anticipating that the treaty would be amended in due course, even the German legal experts decided that a case existed, if not for European spatial planning, then at least for a common territorial cohesion policy (Ritter, 2009).

But in 2005, French and Dutch referenda shipwrecked the Treaty, establishing a Constitution for Europe. It was only at the end of 2009 that a toned-down version – the current Lisbon Treaty – came into force. It was then that 'territorial cohesion' became what is called a shared competence of the EU.

It is not always appreciated that a shared competence gives leeway to member states to reject the exercise of said competence on the ground that they themselves could deal with, in this case, the matter of territorial cohesion. Each for its own reasons, Germany and the United Kingdom did precisely that. So, there was no follow-up to the Commission's 2008 'Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion'. The Commission has been trying ever since to infuse Cohesion policy with elements of territorial cohesion, but there is no territorial cohesion policy as such: a far cry, this, from what might have been expected one or two decades before.

Let this be an object lesson on how the EU works: its members, sovereign states each, are all-important. Under the theory of international relations – and here I return to the notion introduced briefly above – not only the European continent, but – with the exception of Antarctica – the entire land surface of the globe is covered with self-contained territories: 'territorialism'.

But this is only half the story. The other half is

that the EU features many overlapping spaces which are the objects of various forms of planning at different scales ranging from cross-border cooperation to macro-regions embracing groups of member and also non-member states. Perhaps even more important, though, meanwhile, there is integration fatigue, putting the future of the EU as such in the balance. Populists are driving governments to reassert control over their territories. I blame this on the 'territorialism' discussed above.

Clearly, European planning is up against territorialism, the more so since populists focus on borders and border security. Balibar argues after all that the sacralisation of borders expresses 'the fact that the state is [...] the people's property' (2009: 193). Like landlords watching over their holdings, governments husband their resources and, therefore, their territories. Other authors talk about 'the submission of all that space contains – beasts, goods, lands and waters – to one single authority exclusive of all others' (Balligand & Maquart, 1990: 31; my translation from the French). So, borders have acquired an almost mythical position, as if they were a skin on the body of the state.

4. Alternatives, if any?

For planners, what is beyond the borders can be a matter of concern: optimal locations may be on the other side, and then there are spill-overs. Remember that borders are artificial, cutting into the life tissues, as it were. Constrained by them, as they are, planners cannot always properly define, let alone tackle, planning issues. To do their job, they need to reach across borders. What happens at the Port of Rotterdam has repercussions deep in the European hinterland; an outlet at Oberhausen in Germany attracts shoppers from the Netherlands. Dutch liberal policies on soft drugs raise the ire of other governments for their cross-border effects. In an ideal world, planners would define plan areas according to the reach of proposed measures – and so would health officials dealing with COVID-19!

But states are the holders, if not of the land, then at least of sovereign rights over their territories. And they owe their right of existence to their representation of their citizens. In so doing, they often compete with other states, making for endemic conflict, which makes sovereignty into an issue for European integration and, with it, for European spatial planning. Can anything be done about this? What are the alternatives to territorialism as an organising principle? In Faludi (2020 [2018]) I invoke Zielonka (2014) making the case for neo-medievalism as a much looser spatial organisation principle, accepting, as it does, that jurisdictions may overlap. This is against the classic Weberian notion referred to above as the state as a container. Before this modernist construct became the measure of all things – before space was carved up into self-contained (national) territories – it was common for jurisdictions to overlap. But containerising space and people – us – is not the only way of ordering relations. Nor is it always desirable to do so.

Neo-medievalism breaks with the habit of thinking about the land surface of the globe being parcelled into territories. It means also breaking with the idea that borders must be sharply defined. In the past, they were overlapping so that there were grey zones – no man's lands. Suggesting a return to such, on the face of it disorderly arrangements, sounds provocative, but remember that the EU as is – a union of member states, each exercising control over a well-defined territory – is deeply problemat-

ic, and this not only in planning. So why not consider alternatives?

Take a flagship project like the Single Market. For it to work, the EU must not only remove regulatory barriers, it must also ensure equitable access, in particular for those on its periphery. This not only means improving infrastructure, but also a whole gamut of competitive assets. So, the EU needs powers and, as it lacks resources of its own, EU member states must provide it with the requisite funding. Administering these funds, the EU has to invoke regulations. In so doing, it restricts the room for manoeuvre of the recipients. Which is why the EU, and in particular the Commission on its behalf, is a thorn in member states' flesh. The consequence is that EU cohesion policy becomes a battleground. (Faludi, 2016). The reason for all this is the prevailing territorialism.

Not only cohesion policy, but EU policies in general are almost universally controversial. Once more, territorialism gives pride of place to member states. Relations – functional or otherwise - reaching across borders play second fiddle. Which leads to shortcomings, including the not unimportant matter of the lack of agreement on European planning.

One could of course wish for a strong, supranational EU engaging in planning, somewhat on the same lines as the Dutch once did. An EU with features like a state could look after the its territory as it became more coherent, true. But, rather than dreaming about Utopia, we had better look at the EU as is, with many functional arrangements overlapping. Schengen, for instance, does not include all members, but it does include non-members; the Eurozone excludes members, some of them by their volition and others because they do not yet conform to the criteria. EU foreign and defence policy is anything but coherent, and migration leads to differences between an inner core and an internal, as well as an external, periphery, with functional relations and exchanges between them (Hilpert, 2020). This quite apart from the fact that some members stay out of it altogether.

What planning exists across the EU is also pluriform: cross-border, transnational, macro-regional. But there is no prospect of an overall plan, let alone a planning doctrine. Even in a mid-size, reasonably coherent country like the Netherlands, the days of doctrine, it seems, are gone.

An example of how the planning of overlapping spaces would look, consider maritime planning (Faludi, 2019). On the sea we find a muted form of territorialism up to the outer limits of the 'Exclusive Economic Zones'. Presently, they are in the news because of conflicts over their demarcation in the Mediterranean. But besides those, there are also the Areas Beyond National Jurisdictions (ABNJ). They are not totally unregulated. No, the Freedom of the Sea and the increasingly intense exploitation of the resources of the sea – and the seabed! – do require regulation. This is what the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) is about. Importantly, regulated areas can overlap, depending on function. So, we need not even invoke neo-medievalism. All we need to do is to turn our gaze out to sea and consider how maritime space is being managed to discover that territorialism and associated sovereignty claims are not the only conceivable principles of spatial organisation.

5. How to teach students about territorialism

I have never given more than the odd lecture about territorialism. But if pressed on how to teach about it, I would draw on my experience of when I was more involved than now in teaching planning. In fact, Chapter 14 of 'Planning Theory' (Faludi, 1973) is about 'Teaching the Planning Process'. When in charge of teaching on the graduate diploma course at the Oxford Polytechnic – with its dozen or so graduate students – I was inspired by Ira Robinson, whom I had met at an American-Yugoslav Summer School. He had taught about systematically generating and evaluating alternatives which suited my interest in rationality in planning.

The project I was given to supervise at Oxford was about the expansion of a small Oxfordshire town. So, I insisted on students following Ira Robinson's precepts. Naturally, this gave rise to discussions; for instance, about having to make decisions with incomplete information and under pressure of time. Students gave me a hard time explaining – perhaps it had not been clear to me before – that the precepts of rational decision-making needed to be handled pragmatically. As regards presenting the outcome of the exercise, students had devised a simulated meeting of Oxfordshire County Council only to discover that through their gaming it led to their intentionally rational proposals being shredded into pieces. Such is life!

When giving input later on to the first two years of the Amsterdam planning course, I drew on this experience and on my research into Dutch practice. Before explaining this, a word about bringing practice into teaching seems in order. It is often thought that the royal road is to let students work on life projects. Attractive though this may be in advanced teaching, I thought it less appropriate in the core curriculum. There, students needed to progress swiftly from one module to the next and into the following year, so we gave them extensive, but stylised, information about the institutional and political setups of the places where we set our study projects. The projects themselves culminated in simulated meetings of the council planning committee. Some students were tasked with presenting their recommendations, with others sitting on the committee, and yet others playing the roles of aggrieved parties. Some students were not only good at, but definitely delighted about role-playing. All learned how to accept proposals being de- and reassembled as expedience required. My debriefing also always included commentary on styles of presentation and on the politics in planning.

I devised yet another expedient way for teaching – and thinking – about practice, which was confronting students with life situations culled from my own research. My favourite one concerned a barber by the name of – no joke – Short (Kort in Dutch). Trying to find out why the pavement in front of his shop was being broken up, he found out that many rules had been honoured more in the breach than in the observance. An initially tense situation between him and the authorities, thanks to his having caught the planners with their pants down, resulted in his becoming a key player. In good humour, in the end the planners even consulted him about the colour of the roof of the small kiosk built on his doorstep. Students were shocked by a lay person getting so much say. They had come to the course expecting to become experts, with say on such matters! Again, this was a good opportunity to discuss matters.

The other example I derived from other research. Again, it concerned a veritable tangle where, being called upon to adjudicate in a dispute concerning a planned container terminal, the planning minister was asked to adjudicate. However, his staff did not have all the necessary information. The ministry also got bogged down in a case that involved many parties with conflicting interests. So, by the time he, or better say his staff, had got around to investigating all the ins and outs, demand for the terminal had evaporated. The verdict given prematurely was reversed by a new minister who subsequently proposed a housing scheme in the location where the container terminal had been planned.

Reading this case study, much like the story of Mr Short, came as a healthy shock to first-year students. I knew this from reading the impromptu reactions I asked them to hand in at short notice. A busy evening later, I played back to them the most astonished and frustrated reactions, giving me once more an opportunity for talking about the idiosyncrasies of real-life planning.

We were going further in confronting students early on with situations of uncertainty. Once we invited the manager of a plant processing organic waste from the intensive market gardening the Dutch are famous for. In this case, permission had not yet been granted, but the pressure to open the plant had been such that he had no choice but to start operations no matter what. His opening sentence to first-year students was: I have got one foot in prison. A good occasion, this, for reflecting on the gap between ideal and reality.

If in the position of having to teach about territorialism I would invoke the same didactic principles, taking situations from real life, knead then into stories of what planners can be faced with, and let students deal with them as best they could. One of my standard cases for first-year students could serve as an introduction. Presenting the case with, amongst others, Mr Short in it, I used to put a slide on the overhead – those were the days before PowerPoint – showing a four-lane bridge across a canal separating the study area from the neighbouring community. It featured a bus coming across the width of the canal separating the two. For the rest, no cars: the bridge was closed to all motorised traffic other than public transport. The other community had not paid its share in building the bridge, so the border was closed for private cars, not because the bridge lacked the capacity nor for environmental reasons (not yet an issue at the time) but because there was this intangible, but at the same time very real, territorial boundary.

Presently, I could think of similar cases in cross-border areas along national boundaries. How about this one: two authorities, on either side of an international border receiving EU funding for improving their respective positions. This was on the assumption that they would reach across their common border. But the authorities on each side decided to use their allocations to improve their internal connectivity instead. Their internal cohesion was more important, it seems, than overcoming the barrier formed by the international border. Of course, there are myriad more cases of offloading external costs, environmental or otherwise, to neighbours: first-class demonstrations of the idiosyncrasies of territorialism. There are also examples of use being made of differences, such as in cross-border business parks where, with some inventiveness, firms can shop for an optimal mix of services and regulations.

So much for the effects of territorialism in

cross-border areas. My research on the matter had of course been about the ESDP and its follow-ups. That work, too, could prove a rich source of episodes illustrating the restrictions under which well-meaning planners have limited scope to pursue interdependences. My favourite would be the case of the Port of Rotterdam and alternatives for off-loading goods from the Far East. Perhaps I would even bring in the New Silk Road.

6. A real privilege: reflection

Episodes like these were my entry points into deliberations about territorialism. Some planners accept its limitations and deal with whatever issues within their own territory, and others reach out. Planning teaching must discuss such situations, including professional ethics, the planners' roles, and hidden prejudices. My guiding principles would be that their education must make students aware, not only of such matters, but also about the motives of, and the pressures on, other actors with whom planners deal.

I close, not without expressing my gratitude for the privilege as an emeritus to be allowed to continue engaging in academic reflections like the ones in this chapter. I suppose I have paid my dues in the past, but now I am able to really follow my own compass, needing no justification for where I am heading, nor where I land. There have been times when this was self-evident in academic teaching and research, but this is no longer the case. Which is why I particularly cherish the islands and niches where academic freedom still persists and where sheer curiosity can be the compass.

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Street scene in Rotterdam. Photo by R. Rocco.

Landscape in the municipality of Vlist, in the Dutch Green Heart. Photo by Vincent van Zeijst - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.

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Theses on Metropolisation

Ten discussion points for research and education

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This chapter introduces the concept of metropolisation, a framework to describe and understand the dynamics of territories undergoing extensive urbanisation. Metropolisation is defined as the transformation of fragmented urbanised areas into coherent and consolidated urban regions through the effects of long-term and intertwined processes of spatial, functional, institutional, and symbolic integration. The metropolisation story is told through ten theses formulated as open-ended discussion points. Individually, the theses aim to provoke debate and inspire further explorations in research and education. Together, they uncover the novel conceptual transformations, real-world mechanisms, and policy and planning implications of the processes of metropolitan integration.

METROPOLISATION, URBAN FIELDS, AGGLOMERATION BENEFITS, URBAN REGIONS, METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE

Introduction

This chapter discusses the foundations, mechanisms, and implications of the concept of metropolisation. Over three quarters of the European population lives in urban areas (Eurostat, 2016) but the definition and boundaries of such areas have long surpassed conventional understandings of 'cities'. Once distinct cities have gradually become embedded in large and multicentric urban regions, following diffuse and pervasive urbanisation processes where stable distinctions between oppositional socio-spatial categories – urban, suburban, rural, natural – no longer hold. These processes of unbounded and extensive urbanisation (Cardoso & Meijers, 2021a) are arguably the dominant form of contemporary urban development. Their constituent elements knit together and interact on multiple scales and through various spatial and non-spatial dimensions, and in the process shape increasingly integrated urban regions. Metropolisation is a framework to describe, as well as a lens to interpret, these dynamics of interaction between long-term, intertwined processes of spatial, functional, institutional, and symbolic integration of urban regions, as they gradually transform fragmented urbanised territories into coherent metropolitan systems at a larger spatial scale (Cardoso, 2016a).

The theoretical framework of metropolisation has been introduced and discussed at length elsewhere, together with its fundamental triggers, concrete manifestations, and implications for policy and planning (Cardoso & Meijers, 2020; 2021a). In this chapter, the key features of metropolisation are presented in the form of ten theses. The reason to formulate them in this way is that while all the theses are interdependent, each one can be read and discussed as a relatively self-contained topic to provoke debate in research and education. Indeed, each captures a claim which is far from complete and is open to confirmation, contestation, or falsification. The theses follow a fluid order. Together, they arguably tell a coherent story; individually, each aims to be a nugget of useful knowledge and a trigger for the discussion of relevant problems in urban research, suggesting paths for further investigation.

1. Urbanisation processes bring about the citification of the region, not the regionalisation of the city

The urban is (nearly) everywhere, but more than a one-way process of urbanisation of what was formerly not urban, current developments denote a convergence of the spatial, functional, and socio-economic features of the spaces of human activity, whose categorical differences and boundaries become harder to pinpoint. The outcome is a generalised 'urban field', dense and consolidated in some areas, scattered and incomplete in others, whose elements differ more in degree than in kind. In this context, the typical features that define urbanity – spatial typologies, urban functions, economic activities, cultural encounters, social relations – can be found again at the territorial scale, rather than being exclusive of predefined nodes (Indovina, 1990; Sieverts, 1997). The qualities, expectations, and

demands usually reserved for 'proper cities' (Phelps et al., 2006) are thus reconstructed at the larger scale. The urban planning toolkit is duly rescaled, and liveability sought 'at any point of the territory' (Balducci et al., 2011) as 'city' programmes, networks, and devices (amenities, transport, urban design features) become 'urban region' programmes, networks, and devices. Metropolisation pays attention to this process of ***citification of the region***, not interpreting cities as dissolving into shapeless urbanisation, but rather regions made of urban fragments consolidating into extensive cities. This kind of thinking in research acknowledges the variety of forms, flows, and activities that constitute contemporary urbanity, and avoids neglecting important manifestations, effects, and challenges of urbanisation just because they are outside presumed spatial categories, it also helps us include areas, people, and institutions beyond our typical assumptions of where cities begin and end in the debate about urban futures (Sieverts, 1997; Piorr et al., 2011).

2. The image of the urban network can be superseded by the image of the urban field

The sprawling morphological, demographic, and functional patterns present in many urban regions can be represented by zonal concepts such as 'field' alongside nodal concepts like 'network'. This shift suggests that some popular spatial understandings, such as polycentricity, might be inaccurate. Indeed, the polycentricity lens sees singular nodes forming networks while actually looking at continuous urban fields where 'it is difficult to disentangle the nodes from the in-between' (van Meeteren, 2016: 6). This echoes similar paradigm shifts in twentieth-century physics from particles to fields as key physical entities, and happens not only spatially but also in terms of functional and demographic distributions and governance arenas. As a way of seeing, the network abstraction is spatially selective and therefore incomplete in its understanding of large urban regions whose main feature is spatial diffusion, with some being ***also*** relatively monocentric and others ***also*** relatively polycentric (Soja, 2011; Hajrasouliha & Hamidi, 2017). These places are defined by regionalised common processes rather than localised and distinctive physical characteristics – constitutive sociospatial processes rather than nominal settlement typologies, in Brenner's words (2013: 98). The demographic, functional, economic, or environmental manifestations of urbanisation can consequently be seen as fluctuations of agglomeration externality fields, defined as zones of influence of urbanisation which are to some extent detached from network nodes or hierarchical roles (Burger & Meijers, 2016). As an analytic and normative concept, metropolisation is to the image of the urban field what polycentricity is to the image of the urban network (Cardoso & Meijers, 2021a).

3. Understanding contemporary urbanisation demands taking a historical perspective over the urban region rather than the city only

The default understanding of urban region formation processes used to be that they originate from large cities gradually expanding over a regional hinterland in a long-term process of decentralization and redistribution of urban forms and functions:

from small to large, from simple to complex. But the history of territories matters: urban regions can also be shaped by collections of well-connected, similarly sized, historically distinct cities operating in conjunction (the so-called polycentric urban regions, like the Randstad or the Rhein-Ruhr), or by mixed models in which cities of different types, sizes, and growth stages loosely expand towards each other until they build a relatively continuous urban landscape (Champion, 2001; Cardoso, 2018). As a result, the vast majority of European cities have several other cities in their close surroundings and the urban systems that they eventually form come in a wide variety of shapes, sizes, and functional relations. The image of cities expanding over a relatively passive and historically non-problematic hinterland is thus only one of the possible paths to an urban region, but taken as a blanket assumption, it neglects the differentiation allowed by a historical perspective over that scale of the urban. A lesson for planners and urbanists emerges here: we have grown accustomed to thinking about the city as an historical body, but not the urban region. The latter tends to be quickly categorised as a 'recent' outcome of urban expansion under contemporary socioeconomic conditions, but that is mainly because the discipline of urbanism was invented to deal with the city, not the region, and we lack conceptual tools to historically observe that scale (Grosjean, 2010). However, there is a long history of ***urbanisation*** alongside the history of ***urbanism***, and territorial urbanisation processes do not appear from nowhere: their patterns have remained remarkably stable in time and the imprints left by the history of their territories partly guide contemporary transformations (Batty, 2001; Hohenberg, 2004; Cardoso, 2018). Different origins lead to different outcomes and to understand the shape and direction of urban regions today, we need a historical perspective beyond the boundaries of the city.

4. Metropolisation processes entail spatial-functional, political-institutional, and cultural-symbolic dimensions

As a lens over long-term, intertwined, multi-dimensional interaction processes, metropolisation requires the differentiation allowed by an historical perspective over the space of the urban region. But metropolisation processes are not just about spatial transformations. They involve 1) functional interdependencies carried by the redistribution of specialised urban function, economic activities and transport linkages across urban regions, 2) political-institutional integration managed by new governance bodies and networks operating at different scales and arenas, and 3) cultural-symbolic reinterpretations of urban settings changing the scale and scope of place attachments and urban identities. These three dimensions are intertwined and interdependent, establishing feedback relations which can stimulate or hinder the unfolding of metropolisation processes over longer time periods. Therefore, looking at metropolisation from only one perspective or as a snapshot in time isolates events from other contingent processes along other dimensions, of which they are both outcome and trigger. For instance, governance cooperation (institutional integration) is important to deliver metropolitan functional redistributions and transport links (functional integration), which may enhance the perception by citizens of a common identity and

priorities (cultural integration), which in turn provides more legitimacy for further institutional and functional integration. This was the case at the time when symbolic aspirations, political urgency, and a bridge across the river interacted to drive the integration of the cities of Buda and Pest as Budapest in the nineteenth century, as much as in the self-reinforcing feedback between the delivery of infrastructural projects and the emergence of new institutional bodies in the south wing of the Dutch Randstad (Cardoso & Meijers, 2020). The three dimensions of metropolisation may play these changing roles as enablers, carriers, or beneficiaries of processes, always in interaction. Metropolisation does not happen in a vacuum, it is embedded in spatial and temporal contexts whose interaction returns unique, uneven, and arguably path-dependent integration trajectories in every urban region. The advantages of strong integration, as well as the drawbacks of poor integration, are experienced differently among, as well as within, urban regions.

5. Metropolisation is an example of a concept developed in parallel research traditions whose overlaps remained unnoticed

Many theoretical concepts do not travel well between different geographical, historical, or cultural contexts. Travelling theory (Connolly, 2008) may create inappropriate reference frameworks to analyse different places, ultimately making urban theory abstract, bland, and lacking explanatory power. But sometimes the opposite happens: scholars in different traditions 'know' similar urban phenomena and develop similar ways to explain them, but observe them from slightly different vantage points and under different names. The conceptualisation of urban regions is a case in point, as it often amounts to local syntheses based on empirical observations and specific research traditions (Cheshire & Gornostaeva, 2002; Cardoso & Meijers, 2021a). Metropolisation, as defined here, bridges these mutually unintelligible traditions which lingered in linguistic and academic silos. It builds upon the notion of French ***métropolisation***, a concept to denote the demographic and economic accumulation in the largest urban areas since the 1980s, as their growth trends detached from the rest of the territory. It considers the approach of economic geography, that stressed the functional selectiveness of these detachment processes, based on specific services and industries, and their spatial impacts leading to a polycentric distribution of activity across regions (ESPON, 2012). It revisits the regional scale systems thinking of Dutch planning (van Meeteren, 2020), namely the concept of ***metropoolvorming***, which, in its aspirational application to the Randstad, aimed to turn the patchwork of urban fragments of that 'disassembled city' into an integrated 'assembled city' of regional scale (Neutelings, 1989; Deltametropool, 1998), precisely through functional, spatial, institutional, and cultural integration. It echoes the related notion of the ***Zwischenstadt***, by Sieverts (1997), in the sense that the city is characterised by a set of devices and relations rather than a predefined type of space and boundary and that these are actually the 'in-between' spaces where people live, work, and should care about: a concept so far from regular understandings of urban space that Sieverts' plea was initially translated to English as 'cities ***without*** cities'. Finally, it resonates with the idea

of ***metropolizzazione***, advanced by Italian scholars who had been looking at what happens in Northwest Italy when urban spaces, functions, activities, and people spread across the territory and interact across extensive territories like in a conventional city, but without ever clustering as compact urban cores or hierarchical structures (de Carlo, 1962; Quaroni, 1967; Secchi, 1989; Indovina, 1990; Balducci et al., 2017).

6. Tighter, broader, and deeper urban region integration became an important policy aim in contemporary capitalist economies

The positive externalities of urban agglomeration amount to the socioeconomic benefits delivered by size, density, and diversity accessible primarily in large cities (Jacobs, 1969; Melo et al., 2009). But these benefits are limited by the problems of excessive concentration – congestion, pollution, spatial competition, higher prices, ungovernability, among others. Capturing the added functional and demographic mass and diversity spread across an urban region carries the opportunity to enjoy the benefits of agglomeration while reducing the costs of overconcentration. Urban centres operating in close interaction engage in network economies that may replace typical agglomeration economies based on local size and proximity (Johansson & Quigley, 2003; Meijers et al., 2016). However, tapping into these metropolitan benefits needs strong integration across the urban region. Indeed, the added economic and functional performance of a set of nearby cities is usually not as high as a single large city of similar size (Meijers, 2008) because flows do not travel seamlessly across urban regions (Parr, 2004). This is due to several barriers that single large cities do not experience as strongly: institutional fragmentation, functional redundancies, uncoordinated transportation, disconnected housing markets, disparities in investment, and lack of common cultural and political references able to shape joint strategic priorities (Lambregts, 2006; Nelles, 2013; Cardoso, 2016b). As a result, policymakers are keen to nurture integration processes to mitigate these obstacles and exploit the potential of the metropolitan scale. This includes building transport links, encouraging complementary functional specialisations, envisioning various institutional governance models – from strong metropolitan authorities to informal cooperation networks – and reframing city branding and symbolic place attachment strategies to explore the urban region scale (Cardoso & Meijers, 2017). This is sometimes seen as an 'upward cycle of metropolisation' (Meijers et al., 2012): integration measures dismantle stable core-periphery equilibria and induce regional-scale urbanisation, which in turn increases the (metropolitan) agglomeration economies present in the urban region and creates the need and incentive for further integration measures (Cardoso and Meijers, 2020).

7. Different types of city search for different gains from urban region integration through borrowed size effects

Being able to synergistically combine the size, mass, and diversity of several places into a larger and well-connected entity is quite attractive for large core cities hoping to redistribute their over-

concentrated activities while still leveraging their economic and political agenda onto the urban region. However, integration must also be perceived positively by smaller cities, which may wonder what is in it for them if they give up some autonomy and redirect priorities for the benefit of the larger scale. The arguments here entail the concept of borrowed size. As initially formulated by Alonso (1973), smaller cities which are part of a larger urban region perform economically better than they would in isolation due to their easy access to nearby agglomeration benefits of other cities (both a large core city and a network of similarly sized cities), including population, amenities and workforce serving the whole region. This definition has been successively expanded (Meijers & Burger, 2017) to note, first, that borrowing size is not only an ability of smaller cities 'upscaled' by a strong urban region. Large cities also borrow from smaller ones and the region as a whole, for example, by hosting even larger higher-order functions which build upon the additional critical mass of the region. Second, the word 'size' is imprecise, as cities can borrow ***performance*** (e.g., faster economic and population growth rates by building upon the economic externalities of the larger region) and/or borrow ***functions*** (e.g. hosting more important activities, infrastructures or amenities than they would attract and support by themselves). Different places in the urban region can borrow in both these dimensions, only in one, or none at all. A satellite 'dormitory' town close to a core city may attract substantial population growth and wealthier demographic groups but still be poorly served by services and amenities. An historic city may host urban functions well beyond its local scale (such as a large university) but the economic and demographic benefits of such functions are not necessarily localised. Large urban regions, such as the Dutch Randstad, are prodigal in such examples.

8. Metropolisation processes necessarily imply urban region unevenness through agglomeration shadow effects

Stronger integration contributes to better functional and economic performance (Meijers et al., 2018). But these net results of the urban region may hide strong unevenness within the region. Indeed, the generative effects of metropolisation processes can result in intra-regional distributive effects producing both borrowed size dynamics and their reverse, known as agglomeration shadows. Some cities may even be unable to keep stable socioeconomic conditions, let alone borrow performance or functions, as they are emptied of population, amenities, investment, and opportunities due to the presence of other larger or more attractive cities nearby. Here, the strong integration enabled by good transport links, coordinated governance, and functional interdependence results in an optimised flow of competition effects which further differentiates among cities and channels the advantages to a handful of privileged places in the urban region (Dembski et al., 2017; Cardoso & Meijers, 2021b). Existing advantages (amenities, people, capital, etc.) tend to attract more advantages and the privileged few perpetuate their condition. On the other end, undesirable urban functions and socioeconomic groups are gradually pushed to the regional (rather than the urban) periphery and tend to stabilise in the places already suffering from agglomeration shadow effects (Cox & Longlands, 2016; Dembski et

al., 2017). This affects the urban region integration efforts, as stakeholders in cities on the receiving end of such redistributions are unlikely to see the benefits of further autonomy loss towards integration. This means that, paradoxically, the places which could arguably gain more from tighter, broader, and deeper integration are those less willing to do so because the advantages are not visible to them – and if they are still willing, they are not likely to engage in balanced power relations to further their integration agenda rather than the one promoted by the urban region winners. In short, need, willingness, and ability to integrate are three different, and eventually contradictory, things which need careful distinctions.

9. The structure of relations within the urban region influences and is influenced by the development of metropolisation

Rather than a grand structural movement with a definite beginning and end, metropolisation is a contingent and uneven process-in-the-making that colonises the unique conditions and contexts of each urban region, namely the intra-regional structure of relations between cities. In some cases, metropolisation processes are constrained and eventually harmed by these pre-existing conditions. For instance, urban regions dominated by a large core city – especially politically powerful capitals – are prone to experience barriers to fair and balanced integration. Large contrasts between cities in terms of size, economic weight, and political-institutional capacity distort the competition for jobs, population, economic activities, and urban functions, creating relations of dependence rather than cooperation (Phelps et al., 2006). They also affect the perception of a fair distribution of gains among places, increasing the necessity but reducing the willingness to cooperate by stakeholders (Feiock, 2007; Cardoso, 2018). Both real and perceived imbalances affect cooperative intensity (Cardoso, 2016b; Nelles, 2009), which points to the role of inherited historical power relations and cultural habits formed over centuries of interaction. On the other hand, the lack of a leading city mobilising the necessary resources to drive metropolisation strategies, taking the initiative to gather actors around common goals, and providing a common identity to the urban region is also an obstacle to integration. Polycentric urban regions lacking a clear anchor point may remain as collections of disjointed cities (Lambregts, 2006) in search of a driver and their identity tags (‘Randstad’, ‘RhineRuhr’, ‘Flemish Diamond’) may be conceptually strong but remain policy buzzwords with insufficient implementation and recognition. Only some types of urban region are able to successfully walk the thin line between undesirable dominance and loose indifference to engage in a generally positive metropolisation process. Identifying and overcoming historical legacies, developing variable geometry governance frameworks where individual agency and horizontal cooperation are encouraged, and developing a strong metropolitan identity – a shared understanding of the meaning and value of the urban region – are key aspects for policy to consider.

10. Individual city features affect the winners and losers of metropolisation

Cities in the same urban region can experience widely contrasting fortunes in terms of their engagement with, and outcomes of, metropolitan integration processes (Volgmann & Rutsche, 2019). The role and positionality of each city in such integration processes – for instance, their ability to borrow size or likelihood to remain under an agglomeration shadow – are influenced by several other factors beyond the relational dimension provided by the structure and size of the urban region. While the direction of causality remains unclear, cities may be benefited by 1) larger size enabling agglomeration economies, 2) historical importance constraining path dependent processes, 3) a greater number of relations to other cities, from transport to tourism flows, 4) spatial-environmental features linked to (perceived) liveability, 5) a demographic profile with high levels of population diversity and that avoids the overconcentration of vulnerable groups, 6) the presence of top-level functions, 7) transport connectivity (Cardoso & Meijers, 2021b; Meijers & Cardoso, 2021). No single place in the urban region congregates all these assets, and all kinds of combinations are possible. According to these combinations, cities can occupy different quadrants of a matrix but a preferred quadrant cannot be assumed. High functional performance may help a city occupy a key position in the region, but poor connectivity will limit its success, while demographic contrasts to other cities may affect institutional cooperation and cultural proximity. Culturally and institutionally proximate cities may be willing to cooperate but this may stimulate the perception of strong functional or economic contrasts. Cities with high attractiveness and liveability, beneficial demographic profiles, and good functional performance may still be embedded in unfair distributions of political power. Each city inherits positionality within the urban region and has a different bundle of incentives, deterrents, and possible trajectories to engage in metropolisation. The bottom line is that metropolisation is an ongoing project, not a condition, and planners and policymakers have the responsibility to bring that project from the potential to the operative level, integrating rather than alienating partners, and reducing both real and perceived inequalities between places.

Closing remarks

This paper told the story of metropolisation through ten theses, each framed as a set of related claims which may be discussed, expanded, and contested. The bigger story certainly covers many different aspects, from the more theoretical (see theses one, two, and four) to the quite pragmatic and policy-oriented (see theses eight to ten), reflecting along the way on methodological aspects about how to look at the urban in contemporary times (see theses three and five). But in a publication like the present one, it is also appropriate to think about what these theses tell us about our work as researchers and students of the urban. It might be useful, therefore, to extract some key practical messages which might be useful to inform urbanism studies. Not trying to exhaust theoretical interpretations or conceptual implications, but rather aiming for concreteness and usefulness in our observation and documentation of the urban, we conclude with the following practical summary for urbanism studies, in the same order of the theses:

1. Do not think of cities within predefined assumptions and prejudices about what they are and what they look like

2. Do not stop looking for urbanity after one network node stops and before the other begins

3. History does not stop at the city gates; look for territorial histories wherever space and human activity have coexisted

4. Do not assume that functional, spatial, cultural, or political processes happen neatly in a void or in a laboratory

5. Learn languages, read beyond the English-language canon

6. Consider the explanatory value of relations between places and events, not just places and events themselves

7. Qualify what happens in urban regions; what is exactly happening where, and why?

8. Do not be satisfied with general net results; look closer to identify winners and losers

9. Delve into the reasons behind the unevenness (of power, of assets, of opportunities) determining those winners and losers

10. Engage in planning, design, and governance practices that give all cities and all spaces and opportunity to participate in a just and balanced metropolisation process

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Street scene in Amsterdam. Photo by R. Rocco.

Multi-Level and Multi-Actor Governance

Why it matters for spatial planning

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This chapter sheds light on how planning is affected by multi-level (vertical) governance relations that shape an enabling environment for planning decisions and multi-actor (horizontal) governance aspects which are crucial for integrating planning with other policy agendas and effectively engaging citizens and other stakeholders in decision-making. The chapter makes a plea for taking those inter-dependencies more seriously and basing planning decisions not only on a thorough governance and stakeholder analysis but also more direct engagement of stakeholders in decision-making, knowledge co-creation, and co-design of spatial visions, plans, and solutions.

MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE, PARTICIPATION, STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT, SPATIAL PLANNING

Introduction

Spatial planning is concerned with mediating competition for land use and property, managing development rights, and regulating and coordinating the processes of spatial development towards desired spatial and urban qualities and sustainable futures. Spatial planning, however, does not operate in a vacuum. In fact, planning and urban design disciplines, like architecture (see Till, 2009), are not autonomous but rather contingent upon a variety of processes, actors, and stakeholders operating at different scales and in different sectors of policy and society. Planning is increasingly done in close collaboration with citizens and other stakeholders to ensure more democratic urban and regional governance, but also, more pragmatically, to build support visions and plans elaborated and gain access to knowledge and resources to design and implement them. Planning is also increasingly intertwined with other policy agendas, such as economic development, transport policy, social policy, environmental protection, climate change adaptation and mitigation, or, more recently, energy transition and the circular economy, which makes decision-making on spatial development more complex and subject to pressures from those (often conflicting) policy agendas. Finally, spatial planning is becoming increasingly connected to various geographical scales and levels of government, with processes of rescaling of decision-making and growing interdependencies – between the local, the urban, the regional, the national, and the supranational – in what one may call multi-level governance system. At the same time, we are witnessing increasing bottom-up activity of citizens and local organisations demanding to have a voice, agency, or influence on the shaping of urban futures, especially in the context of growing inequality and the challenges of digital and sustainability transitions.

An important reason for this growing dependence of planning on multiple levels of government, processes cutting across multiple geographical scales, and involving multiple actors and stakeholders from diverse sectors and societal groups, is the fact that planning increasingly requires dealing with the so-called wicked problems. These problems involve a diversity of stakeholders, are notoriously hard to define, riddled with uncertainty about how they will unfold, interconnected with other problems, and impossible to solve with a 'silver-bullet' solution (see Rittel & Webber, 1973). Prime examples of urban wicked problems include urban inequality or climate change mitigation and adaptation. Planners are far from being all-knowing experts and cannot address those problems alone. To quote John Forester, 'we should be wary or distrusting of any experts who seemed confident about actually "solving" these kinds of policy problems!' (Forester, 2020: 112).

The main message that this chapter conveys is that the shifts needed to tackle wicked urban problems make spatial planning a boundary spanning activity, whereby planning decisions and actions have to span across administrative, sectoral, and/or scalar boundaries. This, in turn, greatly increases the complexity of planning and calls for more flexibility, adaptivity, and the paying of more attention to the vertical and horizontal interdependencies, interests, and power relations. Planning depends

on what happens above the city scale (policies and processes with territorial impacts related to the regional, national, and supranational scales and levels of government) and below it at the scale of the district and neighbourhood. In the face of wicked problems and growing complexity of urban issues, planners also depend on the actors and stakeholders around them, namely on officials dealing with a variety of public policies, on the authorities of the municipalities and regions their jurisdiction, on private sectors players, on organised civil society, on providers of technical expertise and scientists, and, last but not least, on the citizens' interests, attitudes, and their (local) knowledge and participation in city making.

This chapter will sketch out some of the implications of these shifts. The following section will discuss planning from a vertical, multi-level governance perspective. Then the focus will shift towards the multi-actor dimension, i.e. the need to engage a diversity of stakeholders in the planning process. The concluding sections will bring these arguments together, highlighting caveats and opening questions raised by the shift towards multi-level and multi-actor planning practice.

2. Multi-level perspective

For the past few decades, in Western democracies at least, we observed a trend of moving from government to governance. As Rhodes (a British political scientist studying this phenomenon) put it: 'governance signifies a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition or ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed' (1996: 652-653). That means shifting from a model of management of public affairs in which the state plays a dominant and leading role, in a hierarchical, top-down decision-making and policy implementation system, towards one in which the state increasingly shares responsibilities for managing public affairs with non-state actors, that is companies and civil society organisations, making the state operate not only as a hierarchical system but also a network system. The term 'governance' is used in various disciplines and policy areas with different aspects of it emphasised, but our focus here is, in particular, on how the state increasingly makes policy together with a network of diverse actors at different territorial levels.

Having observed how, since the late 1980s, the European states find themselves increasingly intertwined with and co-dependent on the European Union (EU) and its policies that have a territorial impact, such as the Cohesion Policy or the European Environmental Policy, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks coined the term 'multi-level governance' (2010), which was quickly picked up and advocated as a mode of managing policies to solve the increasingly complex and interconnected urban and regional challenges by the EU itself (European Commission, 2020) as well as other international organisations, including the OECD (2017,2019) or UN-HABITAT (2022). Multi-level governance has two dimensions. The first is vertical, which relates to the 'multi-level' component of the term referring to increased interdependence of authorities operating at different levels of government, from the city, through regions, to national governments, and even supranational organisations like the EU. Whereas, the second can be defined as horizontal and relates more to the increasing interdependence between governments and non-governmental actors, who

also operate at different territorial levels (Bache & Flinders, 2004).

Let us first ponder the multi-level or vertical dimension. The territorial organisation of states comes in different shapes and sizes but is typically hierarchical and involves the central- or national-government level on top, a form of sub-national administration, with certain powers and responsibilities, operating at the regional level (e.g. provinces, regions, counties), and local level governments running public affairs in municipalities. This can be compared to a Matryoshka doll, with a large doll containing a smaller one, and that one containing an even smaller one, and so on (see Figure 1). In the last few decades, the levels of government below the national government have been gaining prominence, with more and more policies and resources (financial, fiscal) being transferred to them in a process of decentralisation of state authority (OECD, 2019; Hooghe et al., 2016).

In theory, this involves coordination between levels of government which are nested, from the national down to local. In practice, however, multi-level governance can be a messy and complicated process with different levels of government interacting with one another in ways that cut across the seemingly hierarchical relations, making the Russian doll metaphor not all that appropriate. What also tends to happen is that there are multitude (sometimes overlapping and changing) cooperative links and interdependencies between authorities operating at different levels, creating a fuzzy patchwork of cross-boundary and cross-level cooperation. Thus, cities and regions can, for instance, interact directly with the European Commission, which manages the EU Cohesion Policy and distributes funding for specific types of territorial interventions directly to the local and regional authorities, bypassing the central government. By the same token, EU policies sometimes create very tangible constraints for planning at the municipal level (Evers & Tennekes, 2016), triggering changes in planning practice on the ground. In other words, the Europeanisation of spatial planning (Nadin et al., 2018; ESPON, 2021). For instance, the NATURA 2000 policy designating certain areas of high environmental value as protected and restricted for urban development. EU policies can also offer concrete incentives for certain spatial planning initiatives, such as planning for metropolitan regions, by provision of financial resources to support the activities of metropolitan cooperation bodies via the so-called Integrated Territorial Investment instrument (e.g. Krukowska & Lackowska, 2017).

We can also take flood risk management and climate adaptation policy in the Netherlands as an example of such complex patchworks of multi-level governance: there is a national 'Delta Programme'. Initiated by the central government and managed by the so-called Delta Commissioner, it is implemented in close collaboration with sub-national actors, with knowledge provided by and through regional sub-programmes in which certain cities play a key role and the local impacts of climate change are investigated and place-specific solutions devised (see Dąbrowski, 2018). At the same time, local governments lack formal responsibility and competences for flood risk and must rely on close collaboration with water boards, the regional special-purpose jurisdictions who manage waters and ensure flood safety. In this task, the city of Rotterdam, for instance, has to deal with no less than three water boards, but also has to consider surrounding municipalities, the port authority, the province, and cross-border partners in the wider delta area. The

(theory) VS (practice)



Figure 1: Territorial administration in theory vs complexity of multi-level governance in the real world (Source: Author, icons: Nikita Golubev via flaticon.com)

need to coordinate interests, ideas, and approaches to designing policies and pooling resources across this network of actors adds to the already complex challenge of adapting to the uncertainties of climate change.

Another good example illustrating the complexities of multi-level governance is the management of public transport in cities and regions in borderlands. Take the case of the city of Luxembourg, which is a capital of a small state nestled between German, French, and Belgian regions. Since many people in Luxembourg, and in those neighbouring regions, commute daily across national borders, regional public transport becomes a transnational affair. Making public transport work in Luxembourg requires dealing with a plethora of institutions and agencies across different borders operating at different territorial levels, comprising, among others, the ministries of the national government of Luxembourg responsible for transport and sustainable development, but also the government of the French region of Lorraine, the German city of Trier, a cross-border municipal association called QuatroPolle, and a range of transport organisations and associations in each of the regions involved (Dörry & Decoville, 2016).

But it gets even more complicated. The EU supports cross-border and cross-national cooperation as part of its Interreg programme and enables the provision of cross-border public services as part of the European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation (Engl, 2016), for example, for managing cross-border ambulance services. At a much higher scale, the EU also experiments with macro-regional strategies

and policies to support territorial cooperation and development in territories belonging to a larger shared geographical space. The EU, for instance, has been promoting such macro-regional cooperation as part of its Cohesion Policy, prompting new linkages and strategic cooperation between national, regional, and local governments, for instance, around the Baltic Sea, along the Danube river basin, or within the Alpine macro-region (Gänzle et al., 2019).

Summing up, these multi-level interdependencies have important consequences for how national and sub-national authorities operate and for the scope of and constraints of spatial planning at different scales. Firstly, decisions made beyond the administrative boundaries of a given city or region, for instance in neighbouring areas, can have important consequences for that territory. Secondly, decisions made at other levels of government, national or European, can have important consequences for planning practice on the ground in cities or regions. Thirdly, planning and coordination of territorial policies in a multi-level governance setting makes these processes very complex and riddled with multiple obstacles, which the OECD calls 'multi-level governance gaps' (e.g. OECD, 2016). These can include, for instance, clashing objectives of authorities at different levels (e.g. with the central government promoting spatial development that allows to adapt to climate change impacts and limit exposure of cities and populations to future flood risks, and the municipal governments planning for urban expansion in low-lying areas to maximise profits from land development) or capacity gaps, whereby some municipalities lack administrative, financial, or technical capacity to engage in implementation of national programmes (e.g. for climate mitigation or circular economy policy requiring expert knowledge and substantial human resources). Fourthly, multi-level governance entails a certain risk of dilution of ambitions, as the core goals and values promoted by a policy or strategy may be watered-down by agreeing on the lowest common denominator between the multiple actors involved. Lastly, planning and implementing policies with a territorial dimension in a multi-level governance setting requires crossing multiple boundaries, across different political, organisational and planning cultures, administrative borders, and policy sectors. Such boundary-spanning activity requires skills, resources, and experience which is often missing in practice.

3. Multi-actor perspective

As already mentioned, multi-level governance includes a horizontal or multi-actor dimension, with the trend towards the engagement of a diversity of actors in planning and in urban and regional policies, from public agencies, market players, civil society organisations, to individual citizens. In other words, this aspect of governance relates to the engagement of stakeholders in running urban and regional affairs. While this reflects wider trends towards network-based mode of decision-making and policy-making, with the state playing a less prominent role, there are multiple reasons which such engagement is a good idea, if not a necessity.

There are normative reasons for this, at least from a democratic standpoint. Engagement of a diversity of stakeholders, and especially of citizens, allows for creating a greater sense of ownership of strategies, plans, and urban initiatives among them and can strengthen the local community bonds. Engaging stakeholders in decision-making and in

the making of plans and strategies allows for the enhancement of the legitimacy of the decisions taken by the public authorities. This matters especially when they entail burdens and sacrifices from the stakeholders affected, as is the case with the increasingly urgent measures to reduce carbon emissions or reduce the generation of waste and consumption of materials, for instance. By the same token, one can argue that by giving agency to local stakeholders and citizens in decision-making on important urban or regional matters and plans, one can strengthen local democracy, without which democratic processes remain distant and abstract for these local actors. What is more, engaging stakeholders who represent deprived social groups, such as the residents of low-income neighbourhoods or marginalised communities – who, depending on the context, can include ethnic minorities, women, youth, or elderly citizens – is a critically important for addressing the growing urban inequality and socio-spatial injustice (see Soja, 2010; Feinstein, 2014, and Rocco's chapter in this book). Thus, participatory practices give these groups voice and agency in decision-making on the future of their urban environments and can help promote fairer and more just urbanisation as well as ensure procedural justice in planning and urban policy-making. Arguably, such empowerment through participation in planning is particularly urgent in the face of growing disillusionment with democracy and the rise of populist voting, especially in the so-called 'places that don't matter' affected by decades of policy neglect (Rodriguez-Pose, 2018) or in areas which are the most negatively affected by the current imperatives of sustainability transitions, such as old industrial or mining regions. Finally, engagement of a diversity of stakeholders can enhance transparency and accountability of planning and urban or regional policies by providing a degree of social control over the decision-making process and enabling the stakeholders engage to hold the authorities accountable for these decisions.

There are also good pragmatic reasons for engagement of stakeholders in planning and policy-making. From this efficiency perspective, stakeholder engagement allows those involved to, first and foremost, navigate and mitigate conflicts, which are an inherent element of spatial planning. As Campbell (1996) observed, planning entails facing multiple conflicts stemming from the tensions between the clashing goals that planning activity may subscribe to: 1) the pursuit of economic growth and efficiency, 2) the pursuit of social justice, and 3) the protection of the natural environment. The first goal entails seeing the city as a location where production, consumption, distribution, and innovation take place, competing with other locations for markets and investors. In this perspective, space is a resource to serve economic activities through networks of infrastructure and businesses districts, etc. This inevitably leads to resource conflict if one considers the development of a just city, i.e. guaranteeing access to public goods and the benefits of urbanisation for all, as a goal of planning. From this perspective, the city is an arena of struggle for a fairer distribution of amenities, services, and opportunities among different citizen groups and communities. The pursuit of the just city agenda, however, as Campbell argues, may entail a development conflict, because providing spaces for social and community needs can encroach upon natural assets which need to be safeguarded and restored. From this perspective, the city is seen as a consumer of resources as well as a generator of waste and



Figure 2: Conflicts in planning, exacerbated by the current major urban challenges. Source: Adapted from Campbell, 1996.

pollution. The triangle of planning conflicts (see Figure 2) is closed by the all too familiar resources conflict between the pursuit of economic growth and environmental protection. Finding ways to mitigate planning conflicts is becoming increasingly urgent in the wake of the major urban challenges of today – from climate change, integration of migrants, coping with pandemics, to the housing crisis – which exacerbate these tensions.

By engaging the stakeholders whose interests are aligned with those conflicting goals of planning in a dialogue, we can seek compromise and win-win solutions to mitigate the said conflicts. What is more, engagement of diverse stakeholders, with different kinds of resources, expertise, or tacit, local knowledge can allow the planners to find new ways and solutions to try and address the wicked urban problems that we mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. For instance, designing and implementing place-based circular economy strategies requires a great diversity of insights and skills which planners often lack as well as the engagement of all relevant economic actors along the value chains to close material loops and reduce the generation of waste (see Obersteg et al., 2019; Heurkens & Dąbrowski, 2020). Participatory practices involving diverse stakeholders in the co-creation of policies or spatial interventions designed to address this kind of challenges allow the planners to pool knowledge and create the needed networks of stakeholders, overcome their limitations, and, ultimately, deliver plans and strategies that have a greater chance of success. Stakeholder engagement can also help overcome opposition of stakeholder groups towards specific developments. In fact, this opposition tends to stem less from NIMBY (not in my backyard) attitudes than from the lack of dialogue with citizens and missing participation in the early stages

of planning the deployment of wind parks close to residential areas (Wolsink, 2000). Thus, participation can boost acceptance of planning decisions and create a sense of ownership of those decisions, leading to more sustainable outcomes. Moreover, pragmatically speaking, by enabling participation of diverse stakeholders in the planning process, planners can identify and engage potential 'allies' and actors who can support the planned developments with resources and capacity to convince or attract other stakeholders.

That being said, stakeholder engagement, just like the coordination and integration of strategies across levels of government and administrative boundaries, is a notoriously challenging task. Again, we can list many normative and efficiency caveats about participation in planning. Concerning the former, by giving agency to a wide range of stakeholders, we risk diluting or even completely departing from the originally pursued goals of a plan or strategy as new issues and interests are brought to the table. More importantly, stakeholder engagement always includes a risk of capture by powerful interest groups able to skew the process to pursue their agenda. The most vulnerable and marginalised groups tend to lack capacity to actively take part in public hearings or stakeholder workshops. Finally, another caveat is the suitability of participatory practices for application in specific socio-political contexts, where there is a lack of participatory practices or other cultural conditions that may skew the participatory process. Thus, we need place-specific and context-sensitive approaches to engagement of stakeholders.

Likewise, it is easy to denigrate stakeholder engagement efforts on efficiency grounds. Participatory processes are typically resource-intensive and time-consuming, making planning activities more lengthy and costly for budget-strapped municipalities. While digital innovations in participation, rolled out in many cities in the last two decades, allow to involve larger groups of stakeholders and citizens in planning, this involvement remains shallow and biased towards the most tech-savvy groups (see Kleinhans et al., 2015; Evans-Cowley & Hollander, 2010, and the chapter by Kleinhans and Falco in this book). Consequently, it hardly contributes to democratisation of urban governance (Sorensen & Sagaris, 2010; Brownill & Parker, 2010). Moreover, if there are deficits of capacity and knowledge about the issue in question among some groups of stakeholders, ensuring meaningful and effective participation can be a major challenge. This is especially problematic when dealing with complex, multi-scalar issues such as climate change (Few et al., 2007). Finally, in the face of the growing importance of regional or metropolitan planning it is extremely difficult to spark public interest and devise effective participation practices at those higher geographic scales perceived by the stakeholders as abstract and distant (see Pickering & Minnery, 2012). Thus, even though citizen engagement in planning processes is clearly on the rise, it often 'remains relatively weak in a sizeable proportion of countries, pointing to the need for further development of participatory planning practices' (Nadin et al., 2021). Against this background, we need to better understand the barriers to effective stakeholder engagement, map and embrace the increasingly thorny conflicts that planning has to deal with, and experiment with participatory practices based on partnership-building and co-creation.

4. Conclusions

In this chapter, we stressed two governance trends that increasingly affect planning: interdependencies across levels of government and across administrative boundaries (the multi-level dimension), and the shift towards multi-actor decision-making and engagement of a growing diversity of stakeholders in planning. Both of these trends bring a promise of helping municipal and regional governments to address their wicked urban challenges. These challenges require a crossing of boundaries between disciplines and organisations and the building of broad coalitions of stakeholders to pool resources and mitigate the conflicts that they exacerbate.

This is probably best illustrated by the climate crisis, which is both a global and a local issue that is riddled with uncertainty and is calling for an 'all hands on deck' approach for the mitigation of climate change and the potential of the built environment to adapt to its impacts. To plan for low-carbon and adaptive urban and regional futures, and have a chance of success, planners need to collaborate and coordinate actions across levels of government, while engaging a diversity of relevant stakeholders and citizen groups. Both of these tasks entail dealing with barriers and inevitable conflicts.

The global shift from government to governance, from hierarchy to networks, is not unproblematic, but it does open up new possibilities and opportunities for improving planning and design processes and their outcomes. There is no shortage of ideas and governance innovations that can be experimented with in different urban and regional contexts, operationalised in the planning practice, and, ultimately, upscaled and transferred across different locations. To seize these opportunities, we need engage the wicked urban problems and embrace the conflicts they arouse rather than ignore them. For this, we also need to rethink the roles of planners as enablers of dialogue and co-production of new knowledge, sustainable solutions, and shared values.

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Mind map made by students of the Department of Urbanism at TU Delft. Printed with permission. Photo by R. Rocco.


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Digital Participation in Urban Planning

A promising tool or technocratic obstacle to citizen engagement?

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Over time, urban planning scholars have studied ways to improve communication and collaboration between 'experts' and the 'public' in planning processes. Social media and the web 2.0 have strongly affected governments' communication with citizens. The growth of public participation, Geographic Information Systems and geo-visualisation interfaces have provided many opportunities for citizens to create and share various kinds of location-based information. Digital participatory platforms (DPPs) are a specific type of web-based technology, often adopted by governments for citizen engagement in urban planning. DPPs are explicitly built for engagement and collaboration purposes allowing for user-generated content and include a range of functionalities which transcend and considerably differ from 'conventional' social media such as Facebook and Twitter. However, simply establishing DPPs is not enough. Previous research has outlined various challenges towards DPPs attempting to leverage citizen participation in urban planning. This chapter discusses five fundamental challenges to effective citizen participation: 1) access and awareness, 2) sustaining user motivation, 3) expectation management, 4) re-establishing routines and practices, and 5) offline follow-up and decision-making. The main question is how these challenges affect the actual take-up and effectiveness of DPPs. Contrary to the common debate, the chapter will show that technology is not the main issue. Rather, the way in which DPPs are embedded in a wider participation approach is key to its success.

PARTICIPATION, DIGITAL PLATFORMS, SOCIAL MEDIA, CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT, CROWDSOURCING, COVID-19

1. Introduction

Participation of citizens in government activities at all levels has received increasing attention in many disciplinary fields, including public administration and government studies, urban planning, public service design, and information technology (Bryer & Zavattaro, 2011; Linders, 2012; Falco & Kleinhans, 2018a). Much attention derives from the potential contribution of social media, digital platforms, and other ICTs to the interactions between national, regional, and local governments and citizens. Because of wider economic trends, welfare state retrenchment, and new knowledge-sharing patterns, citizens' demands and governments' actions increasingly require two-way engagement and collaboration (Kleinhans et al., 2015). The growth of public participation geographic information systems (PPGIS), crowdsourcing, volunteered geographic information (VGI), and geo-visualization interfaces such as Open Street Map, play a fundamental role in citizen engagement strategies (Brown & Kytta, 2014). The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the adoption of new technologies and operational practices, also in terms of digital participation (Bricout et al., 2020).

While there is an abundance of literature on the use of social media for citizen-government relationships (e.g. Bryer & Zavattaro, 2011; Mergel, 2013), this chapter focuses on a specific type of ICT: digital participatory platforms (DPPs). These are defined as a specific type of social media explicitly built for participatory, engagement, and collaboration purposes allowing for user-generated content and include a range of functionalities which transcend and considerably differ from 'conventional' social media such as Facebook, Twitter, or Instagram. A few examples of such DPPs are Carticipe (Lille), Citizinvestor (Tampa), Commonplace (London, Newcastle, and other cities), Sticky World (Hexham), Better Rejkjavik, Maptionnaire (many countries), and Decide Madrid. Previous research has outlined various challenges to overcome in making DPPs effectively leverage citizen participation in urban planning. Without attempting to be exhaustive, this chapter uses a literature review and 27 semi-structured interviews (reported elsewhere) with public agencies and platform founder to identify five of such challenges:

1. **access and awareness**
2. **(sustaining) user motivation**
3. **expectation management**
4. **re-establishing routines and practices**
5. **offline follow-up and decision-making**

The main question we wish to address is how these challenges affect the actual take-up and effective deployment of DPPs. The chapter starts from the premise that availability and development of technology is not the main issue that needs to be addressed. Rather, the ways in which the technology is embedded in both the involved institutions and the actual participation process are more influential for the overall effectiveness of participation. However, both in planning education and the debate among practitioners, the technology itself tends to overshadow other important issues, in the wake of a dominant smart city discourse (Hasler et al., 2017; Robinson & Johnson, 2020; Townsend, 2013). This

chapter shows how the five challenges underscore the observation that 'citizens will only continue to participate if they derive some value from doing so' (Webster & Leleux, 2018: 106). In the next section, we provide a brief theoretical background to digital participation in the context of urban planning. The third section analyses the nature of the challenges for effective leverage of digital participation. The final section offers conclusions and will also reflect on how planning education should approach digital participation in its curriculum.

2. Citizen participation and digital platforms in urban planning

From the second half of the twentieth century onwards, urban planning researchers have studied many ways to increase and improve collaboration, communication, and interaction between 'experts' and the 'public' in the planning process (Friedmann, 1973; Healey, 1997; Brownill & Parker, 2010). Essentially, citizen participation is considered to be 'a cornerstone of democracy' (Roberts, 2004: 315), in which democratic legitimacy strongly depends on the nature and quality of public decision-making. Roberts (2004: 320) defined citizen participation as 'the process by which members of a society (those not holding office or administrative positions in government) share power with public officials in making substantive decisions and in taking actions related to the community'. In the context of urban planning, 'public participation may be defined at a general level as the practice of consulting and involving members of the public in the agenda-setting, decision-making, and policy-forming activities of organizations or institutions responsible for policy development' (Rowe & Frewer, 2004: 512). For example, citizens may contribute to developing plans for regeneration of public squares, parks or wider neighbourhood and infrastructure redevelopment.

Conventional citizen participation methods include a range of tools and tactics: referenda, public hearings, public surveys, conferences, town hall meetings, public advisory committees, or focus groups (Shipley & Utz, 2012). Most methods require citizens to be physically present at a particular time and place. This characteristic is associated with a range of practical problems of participation, such as limitations of time and costs in the process of policymaking, lack of motivation among citizens, weak citizen expertise, or difficulties of including socioeconomically disadvantaged and less articulate groups in the process (Roberts, 2004; Shipley & Utz, 2012; Falco, 2016).

Recently, urban planning has been reinventing itself in a multi-vocational, fragmented, and actor-relational way, underscored by the influence and power of self-organisation of various groups, associations, and networks (Boonstra & Boelens, 2011). This has been accompanied by the rise of new approaches to citizen participation that move beyond conventional methods and attempt to include various stakeholders in a more equal way. Online methods are increasingly adopted, as the Internet's unique many-to-many interactivity and ubiquitous communications promise to enable participation and co-production between citizens and governments on an unprecedented scale (Linders, 2012: 446). Many authors have identified various levels of citizens engagement and participation in government activities through the use of digital technologies (Desouza & Bhagwatwar, 2014; Ertiö,

2015; Linders, 2012; Williamson & Parolin, 2013). Such conceptualisations add to the widely acknowledged ladders developed in the past as well as more recent spin-offs (e.g., Arnstein, 1969; Falco, 2016; Hassler et al., 2017; IAP2, 2018).

As mentioned in the introduction, DPPs sustain a wide variety of features that allow for different forms of participation and collaboration between public and private actors. A systematic review of DPPs has identified the following functionalities: opinion maps, surveys, discussion forums, budget allocation, simulation design, voting and ranking of ideas, analytics, map-based and geo-located inputs for collaborative mapping (through comments, pins, or geographical features), crowdfunding, exporting in different file formats, importing and media uploading, and sharing on other social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter (Falco & Kleinhans, 2018a). However, regardless of platform functionalities, which challenges need to be addressed to make DDPs 'work'?

3. Five challenges for effective leverage of digital participation

In this section, we address five fundamental challenges to digital, platform-based participation that are evidenced in the literature: 1) access and awareness, 2) sustaining user motivation, 3) expectation management, 4) re-establishing routines and practices, and 5) offline follow-up and decision-making.

3.1 Access and awareness

Digital participation concerns real life issues in the 'offline' world and relies on material tools and infrastructures. In other words, citizens who want to participate digitally must access the means and tools to do so. However, there is compelling evidence for a digital divide across many dimensions, ranging from socioeconomic status to competences and skills (Norris, 2001). In its essence, digital participation requires a stable Internet connection, a personal computer, tablet, or smartphone. While basic Internet access is common in many developed countries, urban areas, and affluent households, it is sometimes a much scarcer resource in poorer countries and remote areas lacking necessary infrastructure, and for poor, low-educated households lacking the means to acquire such access. COVID-19 has exacerbated existing social inequalities, including those regarding access, because huge parts of work, education, public administration, services, and other key elements of public life were moved online seemingly overnight during full lockdowns (Robinson & Johnson, 2020). In many cities across Europe, local governments and schools hastily distributed laptops and internet connections among children in deprived households, attempting to address the acute digital divide (e.g. Coughlan, 2020).

Digital (il)literacy is another key dimension of access (Bertot et al., 2012; Media Smarts, n.d.; Pizaco-Vela et al., 2012). Digital participation usually requires language processing, navigation skills, and critical thinking. Even in developed countries, significant proportions of the population have difficulty in reading, writing, and interpreting text and forms. Hence, digital illiteracy may create a barrier beyond basic access. Apart from the 'haves' and

'have-nots', there is also a distinction between the 'cans' and 'cannots'. In the latter category, visually impaired people and language minorities are an often-forgotten attention group. Even though the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated a shift to digital technology-mediated, pervasive, applications across society, disparities in digital literacy and access, affordability, and usability continue to pose challenges for marginalized populations (Bricout et al., 2020: 94-95).

Finally, awareness is an important dimension of access (De Filippi et al., 2019). The presence of an online platform or portal established for participation purposes is not sufficient to attract people. A lack of participation cannot be directly equated to non-engagement of potential platform users. In fact, 'the reasons or motivations for non-participation are diverse, ranging from lack of awareness to disinterest, abstention, and exclusion' (Lutz & Hoffmann, 2017: 889). Hence, potential participants need to know about the existence of a designated DPP, preferably through information channels that are deeply rooted in their daily routines. Such channels may include 'offline' sources, ranging from local newspapers and leaflets to information stands, and word of mouth.

3.2 Sustaining user motivation

Just as with any other form of participation, digital participation requires 'action' from users, which can range from reading or listening or clicking points on a map to voicing comments, offering suggestions, participating in online debates, etc. Users need to be either intrinsically or extrinsically motivated, or both, to venture into participation. Shared interests and values are critical (De Filippi et al., 2019). Examples of intrinsic motivation are issues in citizens' direct living environment, such as reporting and solving maintenance issues (e.g. fixing potholes, broken street lighting, sidewalks, playgrounds) or contributing to regeneration of public squares, parks, or neighbourhood redevelopment plans. Extrinsic motivation refers to situations in which stakeholders are explicitly invited to participate in a specific setting, or when external events activate users to start participating. In both cases, keeping users motivated is crucial for the overall effectiveness of the participation scheme, as 'citizens will only continue to participate if they derive some value from doing so' (Webster & Leleux, 2018: 106).

DPPs may attract users out of curiosity for the medium. A potential advantage of 'early adopters' attracted by novelty is that they may convince other prospective users to join in. However, a disadvantage of 'early adopters' is that they may become bored quickly. This emphasises the importance of inviting, accessible, and careful design logics for DPPs, as well as adding incentives and gaming elements, to increase the 'fun factor' of digital participation (Baldwin-Philippi & Gordon, 2013; Lam et al., 2015; Thiel, 2017). However, the behaviour of users on the platform is also important. Researchers increasingly express their concerns in relation to harmful or destructive forms of online participation that frightens off other users, such as blasting, incivility, hate speech, bullying, and indignation (Lutz & Hoffmann, 2017: 889).

A key challenge to sparking and sustaining user motivation is the extent to which users feel that the act of participation is rewarded by platform owners recognising their input, responding to it, or highlighting links between user input and the chosen scenario(s) or outcome. Adoption of new

technology, such as DPPs, 'often comes bundled with the expectations that there will be a positive change or improvement in how citizens relate to governments' (Robinson & Johnson, 2016: 60). Users expect or require that their time and efforts pay off. The notion of *quid pro quo* is particularly important when prospective users are aware that it is not always possible to identify how the produced data are employed in the urban planning process (Hasler et al., 2017) and that the overall outcomes of the participation platform may be uncertain and located in the distant future.

A common cause for stagnating or declining user motivation is a lacking sense of ownership regarding the participation and site in general and the platform in particular. For DPPs to be 'responsive to the social and ethical needs of a specific community of interest, it is important to make a paradigm shift for policy design, from "borderless" technology to technology that is participatory and situated in a locale' (Bricout et al., 2020: 99). A possible mitigation strategy is creating a white-label version of the DPP, i.e. a local version of a generic platform, tailored to specific contextual needs and incorporating the *couleur* locale so that users can recognise their own situation.

3.3 Expectation management

The attraction of digital participation lies in the 'Internet's unique many-to-many interactivity and ubiquitous communications [that] promise to enable participation and coproduction between citizens and governments on an unprecedented scale' (Linders, 2012: 446). However, on a day-to-day basis, this promise meets a sobering reality. Despite a growing number of web-based and mobile-based platforms that enable information sharing and interaction between government and citizens, scholars have highlighted that the use of DPPs is not yet interactive and is not able to sustain two-way communication (Williams & Parolin, 2013; Ertiö, 2015). In fact, governments often stick to representation, applying 'push strategies' to provide one-way information (Mergel, 2013). Moreover, while citizens may expect a dialogue with the local government or other stakeholders, the actual engagement strategy invites co-production of content without necessarily engaging contributors in dialogue (Mossberger et al., 2013). In other words, citizens may have interaction expectations which are quite different from the intentions of the platform owners or the institutions using the platform to facilitate digital participation.

The above argument emphasises the need for expectation management, i.e. communicating by all possible means what platform users can expect in terms of interaction, frequency, nature, and impact of responses to inputs, impact of the platform inputs on the final outcome of the participation process, as well as the expected timeline and deliverables for each stage of the participation.

There are three reasons why civil servants and public officials are often hesitant or even outright against responding in real-time to digital participation inputs by citizens. First, making mistakes during the interaction, for example making promises which cannot be fulfilled, bears the risk of political consequences and creating distrust. Second, civil servants may refer to negative participation legacies. These refer to previous experiences with participation attempts that did not work out as expected, or simply failed to attract a sufficient critical mass of participants. Finally, civil servants face the daunting task of filtering information from the 'wisdom of the

crowd' towards a narrow selection of a few or even a single solution, strategy, or policy alternative in the context of scarce resources (Seltzer & Mahmoudi, 2013). This process of selection inherently involves 'disqualifying' inputs and alternatives suggested by users.

3.4 Re-establishing routines and practices

The intentions of government agencies and other actors to enlarge digital participation by 'the public' raise significant organisational challenges. In fact, digital participation often requires a fundamental revision of daily routines, practices, and protocols in public agencies. On a basis of a review of the literature and semi-structured interviews conducted over a number of years (Falco & Kleinhans, 2018a; Kleinhans, Falco & Babelon, 2021), we are able to draw five lessons learned. First, agencies need to meet regulations on privacy, data protection and security, and accessibility of media, for example for people with various disabilities or language minority groups (Bricout, 2020). Relatedly, agencies need to prepare clear strategy and policy guidelines on how to stimulate digital participation. Such guidelines should include demographics, target populations and stakeholders, feedback, monitoring, and measuring activities on platforms (Bryer & Zavattaro, 2011; Falco & Kleinhans, 2018b). Third, the revision should also include necessary changes in the 'back offices' of governments to adequately react on citizens' inputs on the selected platforms, and to establish meaningful interactions among citizens (Baldwin-Philippi & Gordon, 2013; Lam et al., 2015). Fourth, availability of expertise and trained personnel capable of 'managing' digital participation using DPPs also constitutes a challenge (Bryer & Zavattaro, 2011; Falco & Kleinhans, 2018b). As a prerequisite to this revision, overcoming an outdated organisational culture which underestimates the value of citizens' input constitutes a major challenge (Voorberg et al., 2015).

Finally, there are concerns that DPPs may actually thwart the improvement of government-citizen relationships and prevent the rise of new practices. While the related technologies make it easy to count people, to capture quick reactions (e.g. 'likes') and to use predefined answer categories, such shallow interactions generate large quantities of data from 'transactional citizens' without actually improving the two-way engagement and challenging deliberative processes underlying government and urban planning decisions (Johnson et al., 2020).

3.5 Offline follow-up and decision-making

A common misunderstanding is that digital participation embodies decision-making. However, urban planning scenarios or solutions co-created through DPPs usually need to be legitimised and approved in regular democratic decision-making bodies such as local authorities and local councils. Sometimes, additional resources need to be acquired and additional stakeholders need to be involved. As mentioned earlier, the collected data, carrying the 'wisdom of the crowd', needs to be filtered into a few or even a single solution, strategy, or policy alternative (Seltzer & Mahmoudi, 2013), which can be subject to political decision-making regarding the procurement and 'physical' imple-

mentation. The actual implementation of a chosen strategy or intervention also requires preparation and deployment time. As a result, there is often a significant time gap between the establishment of a range of options or specific choice through the DPP and the resulting changes in the built environment, physical infrastructures or community services (see e.g. Hasler et al., 2017). Such a time lag may be a source of misunderstanding incomprehension or frustration by citizens thinking 'why does it take so long?'.

4. Conclusions

In the wake of wider economic trends, welfare state retrenchment, new knowledge-sharing patterns, and the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been increasing interest in fostering digital forms of participation in public policy, and urban planning in particular. More specifically, the rise of Smart Cities and the pandemic's impact on public health and economics are considered as drivers of more pervasive technology and further development of digital planning applications, with attendant benefits and challenges (Bricout et al., 2020: 95). This chapter has focussed on a specific type of participatory ICTs, namely digital participatory platforms (DPPs).

Our premise is that availability and development of technology is not the main challenge to digital citizen engagement. In the process between crowdsourcing citizens' ideas and their selection and ultimate realisation, the technological element is modest in relation to the importance and extent of public decision-making and implementation, which requires a lot of time, energy, and expectation management. Moreover, any sincere governance culture puts citizens and their (tacit) knowledge and inputs at the centre, rather than the technology itself. As for crowdsourcing and digitally enabled exchange, the tools are already widely available, but their effectiveness and inclusiveness are contingent upon the extent to which the following five fundamental challenges can be addressed: 1) access and awareness, 2) sustaining user motivation, 3) expectation management, 4) re-establishing routines and practices, and 5) offline follow-up and decision-making. Meeting these challenges requires strategies by initiators, often government agencies, to ensure that citizens from all backgrounds and societal positions have (the economic means and technical capacity to) access, are aware of the options, continue to be motivated, and are aware of what they can expect from their input. In turn, governments must adapt their procedures and daily practices to ensure that they can adequately respond to, incorporate, and decide upon citizens' online inputs and 'materialise' these in the decision-making and subsequent interventions in the real world.

While technology often dominates the discourse on digital participation, these requirements emphasise the position of DPPs as elements in a wider, 'non-technological' process of carefully crafted citizen engagement. Not effectively addressing these requirements will render DPPs a technocratic obstacle rather than a promising tool. This is a key implication for planning education. Planning students should understand that citizen participation is 'a cornerstone of democracy' (Roberts, 2004: 315), in which democratic legitimacy strongly depends on the nature and quality of public decision-making.

Planning education should train students in facilitating the requirements discussed above, which extend to the full process of preparation, implementation, and follow-up of digitally support-

ed participation. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has taught us a lesson that needs to be passed on in education. Regardless of all available means of digital interaction, human beings crave face-to-face interaction, representation, recognition, and tangible consequences of our acts in the physical world. DPPs carry an imminent danger in this respect. 'As citizens become removed from the more challenging, involved, slower, traditional forms of citizen engagement, and funnelled towards transactional forms of engagement, supported by technology, opportunities for robust, high-quality civic discourse are lost, replaced with an emphasis on speed and quantity of connections' (Robinson & Johnson, 2016: 62). Meaningful and democratically viable citizen engagement requires planners and planning educators to ultimately think about people, not about heat maps, pins, geo-tagged comments, or sticky notes.

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Street scene in Amsterdam (2015). Photo by R. Rocco.


LA GRANJA

Agency in Planning

(Future) planners as key actors in the strive for sustainable urban development

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Sustainable urban development is currently a ubiquitous objective in spatial planning (not least due to the UN Sustainable Development Goals). However, the concrete actions to achieve sustainable urban development vary greatly. This chapter looks at the topic of agency in planning and discusses how actors have been conceptualised in planning research. Research on agency can make a significant contribution to better understand which challenges actors face in planning practice, how actors are influenced by organisations and administrative systems they work in, and how we can help (future) planners to cope with wicked problems.

SUSTAINABLE URBAN DEVELOPMENT, AGENCY IN PLANNING, ACTORS IN PLANNING, PLANNING PRACTICE, PLANNING EDUCATION

1. Introduction

Sustainable urban development is currently a ubiquitous objective in land use planning and spatial development. To make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable is one of 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations, 2017). Sustainable urban development is also the guiding theme in the New Urban Agenda (Habitat III, 2017) and several policy documents published at the European Union scale (EU Ministers Responsible for Urban Matters, 2016; Territorial Agenda of the European Union 2020, 2011). Consequently, actors working in urban and regional planning worldwide have recognised their crucial position in striving for sustainable urban development and acknowledged their obligation to do so. However, concrete actions aimed at sustainable urban development in spatial planning vary greatly between and within countries, regions, and cities.

Planning practice all around the globe exemplifies this ambiguity. While the promotion of ecologically, economically, socially, and culturally sustainable development is often an overarching goal in planning laws and national strategies, legal and policy documents typically remain vague regarding what sustainability means for cities, regions, the state, and citizens. Consequently, planning actors strive for considerably different objectives conflated under the umbrella of sustainable urban development, for example, cutting carbon emissions, ensuring liveability (particularly in shrinking regions), reducing segregation (particularly in urban environments), or making planning more inclusive for all citizens. Each of these objectives can, in turn, be achieved through a multitude of diverse actions, illustrating the complexity inherent in the term sustainable urban development.

In this chapter, I argue that actors involved in the planning process play a crucial role in translating abstract goals, such as sustainable urban development, into concrete actions, policies, projects, and plans. On the one hand, it is often individuals (such as planners or politicians) who take the initiative, steer the public debate, and thus guide urban transformations. On the other, collective actors (such as city planning departments) have established organisational cultures which affect their ways of working and shape their vision of a sustainable future. Actors working within these organisations are not unfettered in their actions, neither are they mere cogs in a machine. Instead, they make active choices that maintain, modify, and transform the forces shaping our world (Healey, 1997). In governance practice, this is manifested in day-to-day choices about how rules, structures and narratives are interpreted, implemented and instrumentalised (Purkarthofer, 2018).

The dimension of agency becomes increasingly important when urban development does not follow linear or hierarchical procedures but unfolds in multi-dimensional and multi-scalar projects and processes. 'Wicked problems' (Rittel & Webber, 1973), such as the strive for sustainability, for which no preconceived solutions exist, exemplify the need to understand how abstract and ubiquitous objectives are operationalised through specific policies and concrete interventions in the built environment and what role actors play in these translation processes.

This contribution presents an overview of the theoretical perspectives on actors in planning research and highlights how the dimension of agency is closely tied to addressing complex issues and wicked problems in planning. The chapter also highlights what place agency has in planning education and how teaching agency is approached at TU Delft.

2. A theoretical perspective on actors in urban and regional planning

In the context of planning, two definitions of agency are relevant: agency can be understood as the capacity to act or exert power and as the person or thing through which power is exerted, or an end is achieved. In urban and regional planning, various stakeholders can assume agency, for example, citizens, developers, politicians, and public servants. In most planning processes, actors from each of these groups play a role, although power is never shared evenly between these groups or among actors within one group. The role of individual actors or groups of actors can also vary greatly during different phases of the planning process over time. In a simplified example, this could mean that public servants develop a draft plan, citizens comment and appeal to the plan, politicians ratify the plan through a vote, architects develop building designs complying with the plan, and investors finance the construction of buildings following the plan. In reality, planning processes are, of course, more complex, less linear, see many iterations, and reflect various interests. However, what can be said with certainty is that agency, i.e. actors and their capacity to act, are highly relevant in all planning processes.

In this chapter, I focus on the agency of planners, and especially planners working as public servants. In planning research, there exists no 'theory of agency' or 'theory of actors'. Instead, scholars have considered the topic of agency implicitly and explicitly in many writings on planning theory and practice. Olesen (2018) provides an overview of the role of 'the planner' in various established planning theoretical paradigms, such as rational planning, communicative planning, and agonistic planning. Without following these theoretical planning paradigms, in this section, I present five strands of literature that are highly relevant for the dimension of agency in planning.

2.1. Institutions, structure, and agency

Among the most influential writings on agency is Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration (Giddens, 1984), which distinguishes between structure, i.e. enduring sets of rules and resources, and agency, i.e. actions and behaviours of individuals. Giddens claims that 'structure is not "external" to individuals' (Giddens, 1984: 25) but internalised through memories and social practices. At the same time, actors have the transformative capacity to change structure over time. Consequently, Giddens argues that structure and agency are intrinsically linked.

Giddens' theory of structuration is considered highly influential in planning research. It has resonated especially with scholars interested in institutions, i.e. the formal and informal rules, norms, and discourses that shape planning. Healey's (1997; 1999; 2006) writings on sociological institutionalism and communicative planning relate the ideas of structure and agency to learning and the construction of knowledge. Actors are portrayed as creative

learners and reflective beings who make choices about which institutional rules to accept and reject. In doing so, actors maintain, modify, and transform the structural forces that shape their lives (Healey, 1999). Jessop's (2001) strategic-relational approach advances Giddens' theory by recognising structurally inscribed strategic selectivities. He thus acknowledges that 'a given structure may privilege some actors, some identities, some strategies, some spatial and temporal horizons, some actions over others' (Jessop, 2001: 1223).

Without referring to Giddens, Scharpf's (1997) concept of actor-centred institutionalism builds on the assumption that social phenomena are the outcome of interactions between individual, collective, and corporate actors and that these interactions are structured by the institutional settings within which they occur. Scharpf proposes a game-theoretical framework that treats policy as the result of interactions of actors whose capabilities, preferences, and perceptions are largely, but not entirely, shaped by the institutionalised norms within which they interact (Scharpf, 1997: 195). The emphasis on socially constructed and institutionally shaped perceptions distinguishes actor-centred institutionalism from other game theories that broadly assume rational behaviour among actors.

2.2 Discretion

Discretion refers to the ability and right of making choices between courses of action based on one's assessment of a situation (Feldman, 1992). Through its focus on the question 'who takes decisions and with what authority' (Booth, 1996: 10), discretion is closely linked to agency. In planning, discretion has primarily been addressed as part of discretionary planning systems, for example, in the United Kingdom. Here, planning permissions are decided on a case-to-case basis, considering context-specific merits, and provisions of the plans (Tewdwr-Jones, 1999). Planning is thus characterised by administrative powers, flexibility, and discretion, and planning organisations or even individual officers have considerable leeway in their decisions. This is considered necessary to respond to complex and unforeseeable developments but also puts considerable pressure on actors within the system. However, as Booth (1996; 2007) has highlighted, discretion also exists in regulatory planning systems, although it might often go unnoticed. In France, for instance, Booth observed discretionary behaviour in administrative officers, who interpreted and, at times, circumvented rules as part of their daily work (Booth, 1996).

While in the legal sciences, discretion tends to be viewed as troubling and peripheral to the law (Booth, 1996), social scientists, including planning scholars, largely agree that discretion is both inevitable and necessary and that complex, multi-faceted problems, such as those faced in urban and regional planning, require some discretionary freedom (Booth, 2007). Discretion is also essential in the process of translating complex and potentially contradictory policy goals into variable local and regional contexts (Catney & Henneberry, 2012). While being less transparent, less fair, and even potentially arbitrary, decisions taken through discretion can also be more relevant, context-sensitive, and efficient than decisions directly derived from rules. Discretion thus needs to be seen as an inherent component of activities derived from the law, including urban and regional planning.

2.3 Pragmatism and practice-orientation

The pragmatist literature in planning research has taken up a practice-oriented perspective to understand better 'what planners do' (Hoch, 1994). Actors play a central role in the pragmatist research tradition. The basic premise is that conclusions can be drawn from observing, analysing, and theorising how planners approach their daily work (Forester, 1999). The focus on practice has been especially prevalent in the United States (see, for example, Fischer & Forester, 1993; Forester, 1999; Friedmann, 1997; Hoch, 1994; 2019; Krumholz & Forester, 1990).

The idea of planning as a practice is motivated by the assumption that both specific contexts and instances, as well as wider relations and consequences are crucial for public policy (Healey, 2008). Forester (1993) sees social interactions as a practical approach to make sense of a politically complex world. He is, thus, specifically interested in the 'micropolitics' of planning practice to understand the construction of governance cultures and polities. Building on Forester's work, Hoch has argued in favour of striving for sensitive and comprehensive planning by making room for practical wisdom, public sentiment, imaginative conjecture, and the power of agency (Hoch, 2007).

Learning holds a key position in the pragmatist tradition. Schön (1983) has encouraged planners to be 'reflective practitioners'. Forester (1999) has developed this idea further and described the 'deliberative practitioner', emphasising that knowledge and understanding are increased as people learn about challenges and possibilities from interaction with each other. Thus, planning work is about routinely reflecting on one's doing while looking for transformative potentials (Healey, 2008).

However, Campbell and Marshall (1998) show that a practice-oriented approach towards agency might be more complex than it seems at first sight. They highlight the tensions in planners' work, such as simultaneously serving the interests of political employers, the organisation, personal values, clients, the wider community, future generations, and the profession. They conclude that the organisational culture is of paramount importance for the daily work of planners and that contradictions between individual and organisational values undermine professional autonomy, organisational loyalty, and overall job satisfaction.

2.4 Leadership

The topic of leadership has received surprisingly little attention in the field of urban and regional planning. One main reason could be that the typical work environment of planners used to be in hierarchically organised public sector organisations where someone – often an elected politician – is 'in charge'. Leadership has thus frequently been associated with politicians, rather than public servants. Crosby and Bryson (2005), on the other hand, suggest that planning now occurs in networks of organisations and individuals in which numerous players share power and responsibility for resolving significant public problems. In such a shared-power world, there is a need for assuming leadership and for leaders to foster a collective understanding of a complex problem, to promote participation and collaboration between different actors, to build coalitions for policy change, to engage in political decision making, and to work persistently over a

long time towards solutions to complex problems (Crosby & Bryson, 2005).

In the literature on regional development, leadership has become an increasingly acknowledged theme. Sotarauta (2016) characterises leadership as a hidden form of agency that could be the 'missing piece' in understanding local and regional development, and specifically in answering 'the eternal questions of how and why some places can adapt strategically to ever-changing social, economic and environmental circumstances while others fail to do so' (Sotarauta, 2016: 45). 'Place leaders' can be understood as the actors who look for shared interests and opportunities to collaborate, promote or co-create shared visions, frame issues, and bring them to the agenda, connect various actors with different skills and positions, and mediate between them (Sotarauta, 2016). This breadth of activities does not typically correspond with a person's job description. Instead, these actors often work beyond their organisational boundaries, or sometimes they are influential without holding any formal position, but act out of conviction rather than duty.

The debate on leadership relates to the duality of structure and agency, as governance structures both enable and constrain leadership. However, the relation between structures and leaders should not be viewed as deterministic, as place leaders not only show the ability to work within the system but also to change the rules of the game (Sotarauta, 2016). Consequently, there is a need to find an appropriate balance between over-emphasising the actions of a few individuals, on the one hand, and the structural factors, on the other hand (Sotarauta & Beer, 2017).

2.5 Planners as humans

Relatively recently, the question of agency in planning has also been repeatedly approached from psychoanalytical and psychosocial perspectives (Baum, 2015; Ferreira, 2013). This school of thought suggests humanising our view of planning actors by explicitly acknowledging the influence of emotions in planning processes (Mladenovic & Eräranta, 2020). Planners might experience considerable emotional strain and fear, originating from political conflicts, interpersonal challenges, intricate dilemmas, and demands posed by increasingly multicultural societies, when facing 'wicked problems' (Ferreira, 2013; Sturzaker & Lord, 2017).

However, emotions are not 'mysterious and dark psychological forces' (Ferreira, 2013: 714), as some psychoanalytical approaches might suggest, but rather a vital element of being a human, and thus needed for sense-making, reasoning, and social interaction. Emotions influence how individuals process information and decide their course of action. The capacity to be aware of one's own perceptions, thoughts, and emotions, accept them, and reflect upon them are crucial emotional skills that constitute an essential factor in determining professional success and good leadership.

This view of emotions is at odds with the prevailing perception of emotional behaviour and rational behaviour as opposites. Hoch (1994) was among the first to argue in favour of integrating emotional and cognitive approaches in the context of planning, suggesting that emotions would increase rationality instead of deviating from it, as commonly claimed. Consequently, he criticises the tendency to treat emotions as a source of bias or distortion that should be reduced or eliminated (Hoch, 2019).

Although the literature focusing on psychosocial elements in planning, and specifically on the psychological skills and demands of planners, is limited, these contributions highlight the need for acknowledging emotions in planning research and practice. Or, as Sturzaker and Lord (2017) put it, 'neglecting emotions in planning means that we miss an important explanatory factor in decision-making' (359).

3. Agency as a key concern in planning practice and education

The previous section has shown no 'theory of agency' in planning but that actors are an inherent element of many planning theoretical perspectives. Returning to the subject of sustainable urban development, this section aims to highlight why agency is a critical concern in planning practice and planning education.

Achieving sustainability and sustainable urban development has turned into an ubiquitous and simultaneously ambiguous challenge for the field of urban and regional planning (Davoudi, 2000; Gunder, 2006; Gunder & Hillier, 2009). While the idea of sustainable urban development sounds 'immediately appealing' to planning actors, it remains unclear how actors construct an understanding of the concept and what practical and political implications these interpretations bring about (Griggs, Hall, Howarth, & Seigenuret, 2017; Williams, 2010). Griggs et al. (2017) demonstrate the variety of interpretations actors hold when it comes to the idea of a 'sustainable city' and argue that abandoning singular ideals which generate immediate consensus in favour of more engaged, if complicated, negotiations could deepen understanding and increase acceptance among actors and communities. Similarly, Gunder and Hillier (2009) argue that hegemonic interpretations of sustainability are potentially detrimental. They claim that governments have used these interpretations to 'justify policies that are not necessarily either environmentally sustainable or socially just' (136). Therefore, the reworking of abstract concepts to fit the spatial and governance reality of specific places is an essential step when planning ideas travel (Healey, 2011). Without local and regional interpretations, sustainable urban development runs the danger to remain an empty signifier (Brown, 2016).

3.1 How can we better understand sustainable urban development through the literature on actors and agency in planning research?

Institutional perspectives remind us of the mutual interdependence of structure and agency. Actors are thus not unfettered in choosing their actions towards sustainable development but might be strongly influenced by the culture and habits of the organisation within which they work. However, new ideas and innovative actions can reshape established structures and institutions, potentially resulting in long-term effects and changes in many cities and regions. The research on discretion highlights that individual planners might enjoy significant leeway in their daily work. This means that abstract objectives, such as sustainability, can be interpreted in many ways, policies can be implemented in different manners, and funding

tools can be instrumentalised to serve various purposes (Purkarthofer, 2018). These processes of contextualisation should not be understood as bad practice. On the contrary, they are necessary to make abstract objectives relevant in a specific context. The pragmatist research tradition reminds us that we can learn from what planners do on a daily basis. Engaging with practice is especially crucial to understand why similar policies on paper might lead to considerably different results in the built environment. The discourse on leadership highlights the importance of assuming agency in complex, non-linear processes where no single actor is in charge. Sustainable urban development as 'wicked problem' describes such a shared power situation that requires commitment from various actors and especially needs 'leaders' who facilitate, co-create, and connect various actors and organisations. The psychosocial and psychoanalytical perspectives on planning actors remind us that planners are humans who can be overwhelmed, fearful, and overburdened, but who can also use their emotional intelligence to create better planning solutions together with others.

All these perspectives are essential to understand that sustainable urban development is not a planning solution but an objective that can be achieved through various strategies. The interplay of individual actors and the influence of the organisations and systems they work in shape these strategies and ensure that context-specific meanings are found.

3.2 Why is it essential to address the dimension of agency in planning education?

Discussing agency is also crucial with a view to planning education: there is a need to convey to students that it is possible to make a difference as a planner and that there is a need to show initiative and take responsibility, even when there is no immediate obligation to do so (Purkarthofer, 2020). At the same time, (future) planners should not feel as if they carry the weight of the world on their shoulders. It is not a planner's job to single-handedly take decisions on the development of our built environment and society. However, by bringing together various stakeholders, critically discussing ideas and ideals, and being aware of the varying interpretations associated with sustainability, planners can play a decisive role in the strive for sustainable urban development.

At TU Delft (and other planning schools around the globe), planning curricula aim to prepare students to assume agency as future planners. Studio courses are common in planning education and follow the idea of problem-based learning (Németh & Long, 2012). In addition to teaching subject-related skills, such courses often also support the acquisition of procedural knowledge. In other words, students obtain expertise in their field of study and learn how to find information and review it critically, work in a group with differing opinions, and present their ideas and arguments persuasively. If such courses are based on real-life cases, students also get the opportunity to learn from and get inspired by the work of practitioners in the field. The role of actors has also been emphasised in 'serious games'

developed and incorporated into education at TU Delft (Pojani & Rocco, 2020; Rocco & Rooij, 2018). Games as pedagogical elements present opportunities for students to role-play and put themselves in the shoes of various actors involved in the planning process, or test the behaviour of different 'types of planners' (Rocco & Rooij, 2018). This helps students to discern new aspects of planning which they may not have considered before, and enables them to discover the pluralist and political nature of planning.

Such courses enable deep and student-centred learning. Let us go one step further towards student-led learning and give them an active and leading role in their education (Purkarthofer & Mäntysalo, 2022). Doing so, we can better prepare future planners for assuming ownership of processes. By practising how to take responsibility, students grow more confident and become more courageous about seizing opportunities in their work life. Moreover, when part of a group of learners, students will improve their communication, collaboration, and negotiation skills and will become more confident to manoeuvre challenging situations as a team. Transferring responsibility to students, for example, by allowing them to decide as a group how to solve a task, propose a solution, or organise cooperation with their peers, boosts student engagement and transforms a course into a collaborative project for the students.

4. Conclusions

This chapter has shown that context matters when we talk about sustainable urban development and that actors play a crucial role in developing local interpretations of a generally accepted goal. I have argued that by reading about actors and organisation in planning studies, we can gain a deeper understanding of abstract objectives. In planning research, actors have been viewed through various analytical lenses to reveal different aspects of their responsibilities, behaviours, and challenges in planning processes. Actor-centred research highlights that actors show creative responses to particular contexts and situations rather than follow predetermined technical procedures or standard routines.

This contribution could not reveal the various interpretations about sustainable urban development that prevail in communities, cities, regions, and countries worldwide. Context-sensitive research is needed to give a voice to planning practitioners and their context-dependent and individually grounded understandings of sustainability. Such research can add greater depth to the ongoing discussions on sustainable urban development in planning and help to understand why some cities and regions fail to achieve their sustainability goals while others succeed.

We know with certainty that achieving sustainability and sustainable urban development will continue to be a major challenge for planning in the future. Solutions will not be found from one single top-down organisation, such as the United Nations, the European Union, or national governments, neither will it come in a bottom-up manner, from individual cities and regions. Instead, success will depend on the actions of various actors and organ-

isations at all levels of government and in all parts of the world. Such non-linear and shared power situations, where no one is in charge, but everyone needs to act, make it especially crucial to acknowledge the role of actors.

When focusing on actors, however, we also need to remind ourselves to not study micro-practices that are entirely detached from their context. As the discourse on structure and agency shows, a better understanding of the relation between individuals, organisations, institutions, and administrative systems, and of the relationships between actors, is needed to grasp how actors do their work, which ideas and ideals they pursue, and which tools and strategies they use to do so. Research and teaching can make a significant contribution to better understand which challenges actors face in planning practice, how actors are influenced by organisations, and administrative systems they work in, as well as how we can help (future) planners to cope with wicked problems.

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Rotterdam Centraal train station. Photo by R. Rocco.


ROTTERDAM

(Re)-positioning Spatial Planning History and Historiography

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Since its emergence in the 19th century, modern spatial planning has served as a tool to address public health issues, to organise infrastructure, or to structure cities and landscapes. Throughout this period, planning has been both praised and challenged by the different actors involved. Governments and corporations have historically used planning tools to advance the political, economic, or social interest of select groups. In some cases, public and private planning authorities have implemented planning for the greater good of the local population. The history of planning contains many examples for better cities, for example, with green spaces for the whole population, public spaces and transportation or healthy neighbourhoods that benefit the society at large. In other cases, planning has created segregated spaces. Colonial planning of infrastructures for the extraction of raw materials or the generation of energy, the segregation of local and foreign populations, of rich and poor, the settlement of low-income populations in the vicinity of polluting industries are just some of the examples where planning has created and supported spatial injustice, often across the globe. Students of spatial planning need to be aware of the background of current planning systems and planned spaces and their global interrelationships to assess the impact of these histories on current and future planning practice. They need to understand the role that planning historiography plays in the promotion of select planning approaches over time and space as a foundation for responding to contemporary societal challenges, informing long-term spatial planning on multiple scales.

SPATIAL PLANNING, HISTORY, HISTORIOGRAPHY, EDUCATION, SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

1. Introduction

In the late nineteenth century, one form of planning emerged as a discipline in England, continental Europe, and the United States. It was conceived as a rational, modernist pursuit for societal improvement in response to the urban ills – overcrowding, pollution, unhealthy living environment – produced by the Industrial Revolution. Planning practitioners tried to respond to rapidly transforming cities, to new forms of production and consumption, to uncontrolled population growth, and to new types of transportation and communication. In short, planning targeted hygiene, housing, and transportation. As industrialisation and colonial empires spread, various planning approaches – land readjustment, building lines, zoning – followed often colonial geographies of power.

Planning has been called upon since the mid-nineteenth century to propose interventions that would steer future development based on calculations, assumptions, and formal criteria from the past. Planners have taken up this complex challenge, often with the best of intentions. They have worked with national governments and local elites, occasionally involving civic society. They have responded to the needs of expanding cities and of transforming nations. They have provided new infrastructure and identified functional zones. They have projected urban futures in times of war and disaster as well as peace. They have worked to integrate existing (planned) spaces and established (planning) cultures into their interventions. At a time when informal urbanism is becoming more prominent notably in recently industrialising and urbanising countries of the Global South, planning history provides an opportunity to understand the motivations for future interventions.

Planning history is an interdisciplinary field with contributions from multiple disciplines. Urban historians, economic historians, social historians, architectural historians, and historians of landscape and the environment, have all tackled questions of plans and planning including housing, construction, local government, social policy, utopianism, urban form, and so forth. Some authors define planning history as describing the formal, aesthetic appearance of the built environment, taking an architectural or urban design approach. For others, planning history comes out of the social sciences, and for yet other scholars it is the focus of urban geography or situated in political, social, and economic histories.

Planning history as a field has existed since the 1970s, and several institutions and journals focus on it, including well-known ones such as wide-ranging English-language books like Peter Hall's seminal Cities of Tomorrow (Hall, 2014 [1988]). While being one of the first books to explore the history of planning, and its theory and practice, Hall's work did not reflect on the field of planning history itself. Several collections include original texts of nineteenth- and twentieth-century planning (Birch, 2008; LeGates & Stout, 2003; Larice & Macdonald, 2012; Wegener, 2007). Broader questions of global planning cultures, as tackled in other works, also include reflections on historical trajectories and their relations to specific national and local traditions (Sanyal, 2005).

A wider range of narratives is important to the re-writing, re-thinking, re-orienting of planning history itself. If Sub-Saharan African planning, for